Censorship in Chinese Cinema by Calkins, Mary Lynne
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 21 | Number 2 Article 1
1-1-1998
Censorship in Chinese Cinema
Mary Lynne Calkins
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 239 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol21/iss2/1
Censorship in Chinese Cinema
by
MARY LYNNE CALKINS*
I. A Brief History of Chinese Cinema ............................ 243
A. The First, Second, and Third Generations .......... 244
B. The Fourth Generation ...................................... 246
C. The Fifth Generation .......................................... 248
D. Contemporary Chinese Filmmakers: The
Sixth Generation ................................................ 254
II. The Laws, Regulations and Governmental
Bodies That Control Chinese Cinema ....................... 259
A. Governm ent Bodies ............................................ 259
B. Legal M echanism s .............................................. 262
1. The Constitution ............................................ 262
2. The Film Administration Regulations ............. 266
3. D efinitions ..................................................... 274
a. "C ensor" ........................ ........................... 274
b. "B anned" ....................... ........................... 275
III. External Censorship Factors .................................... 278
A . Cultural Codes ................................................... 278
1. Li an d Fa ....................................................... 278
2 . G u anxi ........................................................... 28 1
B . Econom ics .......................................................... 282
C. International Diplomacy ..................................... 285
1. International Film Festivals .......................... 288
2. The Importation and Censorship of
Non-Chinese Film s ......................................... 291
IV. Film Production and the Censorship Process
in Contemporary China ............................................ 296
A. Five Methods of Film Production ........................ 297
1. State-studio Film s ......................................... 297
2. Co-productions .............................................. 297
3. Changbiao ..................................................... 299
* J.D., Georgretown University Law Center, 1998; B.A. Dickinson College,
1992. Ms. Calkins is an associate at Holland & Knight LLP, and previously
published "Make Friends First, Certify Later: China and ISO 14000" in the
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (1997).
240 Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. [Vol. 21:239
4. Hong Kong-funded Films ............................... 299
5. Independent Films ......................................... 302
B. Film Production and the Censorship Process ...... 304
1. Script Approval .............................................. 304
a. Content ..................................................... 306
b . Style .......................................................... 323
2. Film Processing .............................................. 324
3. Approval Upon Completion ............................ 325
4. Taking the Film Out of China ......................... 326
V. Reactions and Responses to Censorship ................... 328
A. International Reactions ...................................... 329
B. The Response of Chinese Filmmakers
and Actors .......................................................... 330
VI. Conclusion ............................................................... 336
Introduction
To publicize the U.S. release of Chen Kaige's film
Temptress Moon (Feng Yue), the film trailer proclaimed Chen's
film "so controversial it was banned in China." Such a
description tells an audience little these days, because so
many artistic, prominent Chinese films get banned in their
domestic market. Considering that any film or play produced
in China receives close government scrutiny at each step of
production, and must be approved by censors from inception
to completion, how do films banned in China ever get made
there in the first place? And just what does it mean for a film
or director to be "banned"?
Within politics, of course, lay the answers to these
questions, because politics traditionally play a large role in
censorship of the arts in China. The government continues to
adhere to the teachings of Mao Zedong, who explained the
inextricable relationship between politics and art in this way:
In literary and art criticism there are two criteria, the
political and the artistic .... [What is the relationship
between the two?... We deny not only that there is an
abstract and absolutely unchangeable political criterion, but
also that there is an abstract and absolutely unchangeable
artistic criterion .... Literature and art are subordinate to
politics, but in their turn exert a great influence on politics.
2
By so elevating politics above art, and by presuming that
the two are inextricably linked, China has left creativity
vulnerable to governmental scrutiny, censorship, and co-
optation. Film, as a particularly visible and communicative
media, is particularly subject to governmental interference,
and the Chinese government has exploited that vulnerability
to the fullest.3
1. TEMPTRESS MOON (Shanghai Film Studio/Tomsen Films 1996).
2. Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art (May 2, 1942), in 3
SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 69, 86-89 (1967) [hereinafter Mao Zedong].
3. Indeed, the Chinese government is so notorious for its censorship that
when major U.S. studios unanimously passed on the chance to release the new
film version of Lolita, it was called "a display of self-censorship that is positively
Chinese." Tim Cornwell, Morality on the march keeps 'pervy' new Lolita off the
screen, INDEPENDENT, July 13, 1997, at 15.
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However, the blanket explanation that film censorship is
motivated by politics fails to explain certain decisions.4 As
China's censors are not in the habit of explaining their
decisions, even filmmakers themselves have to guess as to
acceptable content, themes, and style. Looking below the
surface of film censorship- at historical context, individual
actors, cultural factors, and linguistic considerations- to
discern nuances, patterns and purposes is therefore
necessary.
This paper examines censorship in Chinese cinema in an
attempt to make sense of a tradition of sometimes seemingly
arbitrary decisions by the authorities. Providing examples of
how particular filmmakers are affected by censorship
decisions, this paper attempts to demonstrate that China
takes a similar approach to film censorship as it does to
contracts, in the sense that censorship involves continual
"negotiations" rather than binding agreement, and in the
sense that articulated standards are subject to overriding
cultural norms and external factors.
Part I of this article describes the six "Generations" of
Chinese filmmakers, the censorship they faced, and the
implications for contemporary films and filmmakers. Part II
discusses the legal mechanisms that exist for film censorship
in China, including the governmental bodies involved, as well
as the pertinent laws, regulations, and definitions. Part III
explores the external factors that affect censorship in Chinese
cinema, including cultural concepts, economic considerations,
and issues of international diplomacy. Part TV details the
process of film production in China, and analyzes the various
factors considered in the censorship process on a film-by-film
basis, including content, style, and temporal setting. Finally,
Part V describes reactions and responses to the censorship of
Chinese cinema. This paper concludes that film censorship in
China, like contracts and constitutional law in China, is
4. The United States Trade Representative has called China's censorship
guidelines "unpublished, and apparently arbitrary and vague." OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REP., 1994 NATIONAL TRADE ESTnMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS 48 (1994).
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contextual, individualized, and continuously negotiable rather
than absolute or binding.
I
A Brief History of Chinese Cinema
Chinese cinema has been defined largely through the
identification of six discernible "Generations" of filmmakers,
each of which represents a specific period in China's
tumultuous 20th Century history. The First Generation
consisted of the early silent pioneers of the 1920s and 1930s.
The Second Generation made films during World War II, with
an emphasis on social realism. The Third Generation
consisted largely of those filmmakers who could not afford
traditional study during World War II, and who thus filmed
with original, less Western-influenced style. The Fourth
Generation made films under Mao, just before the Cultural
Revolution. The Fifth Generation was comprised of the first
wave of filmmakers after the Cultural Revolution interrupted
Chinese cinema, and was influenced by the refined
approaches of Akira Kurosawa and Jean-Luc Godard. The
Sixth Generation is the contemporary group whose recent
emergence demonstrates influence by such effects and
suspense masters as Steven Spielberg and Alfred Hitchcock.
Although each generation does inherently tend to display
some common themes and approaches, the generational
categories reflect how, unlike "schools" of filmmaking that are
identified by adherence to a particular artistic style or abstract
philosophy, each of these "generations" is united more by its
place in China's tumultuous 20th Century political history
than by adherence to a particular artistic style or philosophy.
Perhaps identifying these artists by political milieu is
inevitable, considering that indeed, throughout China's
history, its identity as a state and as a civilization has been
shaped largely by the interaction between culture and
politics.
5
5. See Marguerite Gong Hancock, The Nexus of Culture and Politics: A Study
of Film in U.S.-China Relations, 9 FLETCHER F. 325 (1985).
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The Chinese government wields this interaction at times
as a sword, other times as a shield. Whereas some regimes
actively manipulated film in order to convey positive political
messages, others passively manipulated film to prevent them
from being a vehicle for negative political messages. In China's
current cinematic climate, the government is holding up the
shield, with intermittent periods of sword-wielding in the form
of massive culture campaigns.'
A. The First, Second, and Third Generations
China created its first movies in 1905. 7 China's first major
film studio, Mingxing, began production in 1922," staffed by
the First Generation silent filmmakers. By 1937, China had
about 300 movie theaters, concentrated in Shanghai and a few
other large cities.9 At that time, China's own film industry was
in only its infant stage, so its cinematic market was dominated
by foreign films, rather than the works of its Second
Generation filmmakers. The Sino-Japanese War and the civil
war between the Nationalists and the Communists caused
China's domestic film industry- along with radio and print
media- to languish for approximately a decade.'0 The right-
wing Guomindang government imposed strict censorship
codes that allowed only a few films to be made that responded
to the conservative establishment and the 1931 Japanese
invasion of northeast China.1"
The Chinese Communist Party's (hereinafter "CCP")
extensive and effective use of film carried Chinese film past
6. For further discussion of culture campaigns, see infra note 195 and
accompanying text.
7. See Wu Ming, Movies: An Aspect of Culture, BEIJING REV., Feb. 5-11,
1996, at 4.
8. Most of China's early films imitated Hollywood musicals and serials. One
1927 costume fable, The Rose of Pushu, featured a local bandit fighting with an
effete scholar who brandished a pencil that had grown to Freudian proportions.
See Matt Severson, Silent Behind the Great Wall, FILM COMMENT, May 15, 1996,
at 47.
9. See Jianying Zha, China's Popular Culture in the 1990s, in CHINA
BRIEFING: THE CONTRADICTIONS OF CHANGE 109, 110 (William A. Joseph ed.,
1997).
10. See id.
11. See Severson, supra note 8, at 48.
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the fighting of the 1940s and engrained it into Mao's
governance and into the Third Generation of filmmakers.
Because the CCP saw uses for films in its campaigns, 2 the
film industry benefited by getting swept up iri the "New China"
movement. The CCP established China's first "revolutionary
film studio" in Changchun in October 1946, but it was only
after the 1949 communist victory that Chinese cinema really
begin to develop. 13 In celebration of the CCP's victory and the
birth of Communist China, another film studio was opened in
Beijing. 14 As Mao Zedong recognized the increasing uses to
which he could put public communication channels to further
his ideologies, cinema and all other media came under
Communist Party control."5 He considered art and revolution
to be two "fraternal armies," 6 allied in the struggle to create a
"new China."
Harnessed in the double yoke of art and politics was the
Third Generation's most prominent director, Xie Jin. The
Chinese government used Xie Jin's films to symbolize China's
communist liberalization,'7 because they were about common
people's suffering. Xie Jin remains in good graces with the
government even today, because unlike later generations of
filmmakers, he never pushed the limits of his craft. 8
Throughout his half-century career, Xie Jin scrupulously
avoided placing any blame upon the Communist Party or any
12. The educational uses of film were noted by revolutionary Intellectuals
such as Lu Xun, as he recounts in the following story: "Once I had a curious
experience. In the course of a banquet I said that students could learn more from
films than from textbooks and that probably a visual method of teaching would
one day be adopted. But my words aroused only laughter." Gino Nebiolo,
Introduction to THE PEOPLE'S COMIC BOOK at xiii (Endymion Wilkinson trans.,
Doubleday 1973).
13. See Zha, supra note 9, at 111.
14. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 337.
15. See id.
16. Mao accused the anti-communist reactionaries of separating these two
"fraternal armies" in his Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, May 2,
1942. See Mao Zedong, supra note 2, at 70.
17. See Stuart Klawans, Zhang Yimou: Local Hero, FILM COMMENT, Sept. 1,
1995, at 13.
18. See Patrick E. Tyler, The Medium and the Message: China's Film Wars,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 3, 1996.
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of its leaders for the issues his films have tackled. 9 As a
result, his films have never been banned.
B. The Fourth Generation
By 1953, China had a number of film studios, all opened
by the CCP: the August 1st film studio, a studio for the
people's Liberation Army, a studio for scientific and
educational films, a film studio in Shanghai.2 0 As a result,
from 1949 to 1966, China's film production steadily increased,
averaging a total of thirty-six features per year.2'
Because filmmaking is an artistic medium that requires
more equipment than paper and ink and therefore requires
money and cooperation from others, filmmaking has been
fairly easily controlled by the central authorities. This was
particularly true for the Fourth Generation, which developed
within a vastly improved cinema infrastructure, albeit under
the strong control of communist ideology. The CCP replaced
all of the independent institutions of culture that had existed
prior to the 1949 revolution- such as artists' guilds, folk art
troupes, literary associations, and publications- with
nationalized media. Indeed, "because of its emphasis on the
moral and ideological education of all citizens, the CCP had
long viewed culture in general as an important tool for the
party's cause and a sensitive area of power and influence."
22
Culture, in Mao's view, must always serve the revolution and
the masses. Mao made this aspirational assertion years before
the CCP actually had the power to impose such a mandate on
artists nationwide.
To align people in their proper roles, Mao called upon
artists and intellectuals to participate in the revolutionary
struggle:
Our literary and art workers must ... shift their stand; they
must gradually move their feet over to the side of the
workers, peasants and soldiers, to the side of the proletariat,
19. See id.
20. See Hancock supra note 5, at 331.
21. See id. at 338.
22. Zha, supra note 9, at 111.
23. See Mao Zedong, supra note 2, at 84.
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through the process of going into their very midst and into
the thick of practical struggles and through the process of
studying Marxism and society.
24
Mao's view of film, however, was not purely as a
revolutionary tool. Film and other arts, he realized, could
carry pollution as well as inspiration. Not only was film a
weapon of revolution, but it could also be a target of anti-
revolutionary tendencies. For this reason, many Third and
Fourth Generation films and filmmakers were praised, then
purged, then promoted again, according to the Party's political
and ideological needs.25
Eventually, Chinese filmmakers were stripped of their
creative status when Mao carried his ideas to an oppressive
extreme during the Great Cultural Revolution, which spanned
the decade between 1966-76.26 Artists and intellectuals alike
were condemned as bourgeois and anti-revolutionary. They
were rounded up into state-sponsored units to undergo
"thought reform," which was socialist indoctrination in Maoist
ideology. 27 "After all the institutional bases of old culture were
thus swept away or taken over, the party emerged as the
country's only cultural authority in full control of a new
national culture that could now begin to penetrate every
comer of Chinese society on an unprecedented scale. 28
Filmmakers, permitted to produce only pro-communist films,
were deemed not artists, but cultural workers. In modem
parlance, they might be considered campaign workers, due to
their existence only for the sake of politics.
These "cultural workers," who comprised the Fourth
Generation of Chinese filmmakers, set about producing new
films that would affirm and convey the dominance of the newly
established socialism. Believing that the party was indeed
leading the nation to a bright, rich future, many filmmakers,
writers and artists willingly collaborated in the creation of the
new socialist mass culture. The highly politicized mass culture
24. Id. at 78.
25. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 328.
26. See id. at 338-39.
27. See Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China 50 (1995).
28. H.L. Fu & RICHARD CULLEN, MEDIA LAW IN THE PRC 111 (Asian Law &
Practice, 1992).
1999] CENSORSHIP IN. CHINESEOCNEMA
Hastings Comm/Ent L.J.
ended artistic and intellectual freedom in China, with creative
filmmaking suffering in a most visible way.
On the other hand, among the various accessible art
forms, Mao especially embraced film for its communicative
value. He used it to communicate complex ideological doctrine
to illiterate peasants through lively verbal explanations. He
also used it to display fighting techniques for guerilla warfare
to untrained supporters who knew only farming. 9 For distant,
would-be revolutionaries sprinkled across the country, film
promoted unity by capturing the dynamism of the revolution
and the voices and faces of its leaders."
Perhaps the most constraining legacy Mao Zedong left to
contemporary filmmakers is the notion that art cannot exist
independent of politics and ideology. Mao articulated this idea
at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art back in 1942:
' There is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that
stands above classes or art that is detached from or
independent of politics." 3' This notion of no pure art persists in
China today.32
C. The Fifth Generation
The Fifth Generation refers to the first few classes of
filmmakers to graduate from Beijing Film Academy after the
Cultural Revolution.3 The Academy had been shut down in
1966, and did not reopen until 1978. Four years later it
graduated more than 2,000 students. Thus the Fifth
Generation filmmakers "emerged from film school just as
29. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 328. For example, during the Sino-
Japanese War, the People's Liberation Army produced training films such as THE
BATrLE OF THE MINE and TUNNEL WARFARE. Apparently these films successfully
illustrated techniques and equipment, because guerilla tactics "became a
hallmark of the Communists, enabling them to sustain protracted fighting in the
countryside with a peasant army." Id. at 333.
30. See id. at 328.
31. Mao Zedong, supra note 2, at 86.
32. See the discussion of Ye Daying and his 1995 film, RED CHERRY
(Moonstone International 1995), infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
33. See Paul Clark, Chinese Cinema Enters the 1990s, in CHINA BRIEFING,
1992 125, 128-29 (William A. Joseph ed., 1993).
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China was emerging from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution
and Mao's last decade in power."34
Mao's successor, Deng Xiapong, used film, but for
different ideological ends than Mao. Rather than suppress
culture, Deng merely subordinated it, emphasizing
pragmatism and modernization rather than political
messages." Deng's era was also marked by an emphasis on
economic reform; some films of the early 1980's even
articulated Deng's evolving policies of market reform.36 For
example, Ways To Make Fortunes dealt with "the
contradictions" of trying to become rich, while imparting the
message that "prosperity is possible for peasants who are
resourceful, honest and upright."37 Similarly, He Is In The
Special Zone celebrates the urban workers of Shenzhen, one of
China's special economic zones .38  Glorifying modern
technology, this film was a tool of Deng's reform propaganda.
Deng recognized that any ideological use of film
presupposed an audience, but audiences would only go to see
films that were entertaining.39 The observation by Xie Tieli, a
veteran film director and Deputy of the National People's
Congress, that "[wlith more money in their pockets, peasants
want to see more and better films," 40 integrates the socialist
notion of serving the peasants with the market economics
recognition that consumer demand shapes the film industry.
This emphasis on entertainment value has become the
mantra of China's film authorities, who point to Hollywood as
34. Tyler, supra note 18.
35. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 328. Examples of such use of film include
Elimination of Wild Rats, Birth Control, and Chicken Raising. See, 1983
Outstanding Films, 3 CHINA'S SCREEN 2 (1984).
36. See id.
37. Ways to Make Fortunes, 2 CHINA'S SCREEN 24 (1984).
38. He is in the Special Zone, 3 CHINA'S SCREEN 20 (1984), cited in
Hancock, supra note 5, at 350.
39. This logical notion has been reiterated more recently, as Dou Shoufang,
Deputy Director of the Film Bureau of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television
commented, "People should love to watch a film before they accept any of the
artistic thoughts." Cui Lili, Facing the Challenge from Hollywood, BEIJING REV.,
Feb. 5-11, 1996 at 15.
40. See id.
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the model in structuring a film industry.4 Members of China's
film community admire the comprehensive Hollywood system
of script selection, technical innovation, dramatic visual
effects, huge investments and star power.42 To legitimize
emulation of a capitalist film power, however, the Chinese are
quick to dispel capitalist aspirations. Instead, they note that
the United States has achieved its success through discipline.
"Hollywood is very strict and meticulous in playwriting, image
creation, plots and many artistic techniques. That's why
Hollywood films have competitiveness and vitality."43 In this
way, attempted emulation has selected only certain dynamics
of Hollywood film production- fight control instead of free-
flowing creativity. This emphasis on strictness denies the role
that freedom and permissiveness has played in the success of
Hollywood films, but is an advantageous strategy to earn the
Chinese authorities' support. To the authorities, strictness
and discipline sound comfortably like political correctness.
For the film industry, Deng's leadership resulted in
improvements to the infrastructure, and relative freedom from
the imposition of political messages.44 Decentralizing the
industry, which had thus far been concentrated only in urban
areas, the Ministry of Culture and the People's Construction
Bank provided loans for the building of 4,000 cinemas in rural
towns, which came to comprise about 80 percent of all the
cinemas in China.45 Feature film production increased from an
average of only ten films per year among all China's studios to
46 films in 1978, then leveled off at about 100 per year after
1982.
As for increased artistic freedom, for most of the 1980s,
the new dialogue between artists and leadership "prevented
the pendulum swings in policy which typified Mao's era.,
46
41. See Professor Zheng Dongtian of the Beijing Film Academy, quoted in Lili,
supra note 39, at 15.
42. See id.
43. Film critic Hu Ke, quoted in Lili, supra note 39, at 15, 16.
44. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 329.
45. See AMERICAN EMBASSY AT BEIJING FILM IN CHINA 3 (China Cultural
Background Series, Dept. of State, 1982) cited in Hancock, supra note 5, at 346.
46. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 329.
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Realistically, any increase in creative freedom occurred not so
much because of broad opposition to curtailment of free
expression, but rather because the cultural regime of the
preceding era had become unwieldy, extreme and even
ridiculous. 7 Deng's broad policy in film and television was, at
least until 1989, to allow exposure to foreign ideas, and to
allow those ideas to have some influence within China, as long
as they contributed to a stronger socialist China. However,
Deng's policies translated into both cooperation and conflict
between artists and government.48 When the film industry
attempted to take advantage of the relatively relaxed
atmosphere by challenging the frontiers of artistic style and
content in their art, 9 the Deng regime responded by launching
the 1983 "spiritual clean-up campaign.""
Overall, Deng's reforms, and the films that resulted
therefrom, did improve the condition of Chinese cinema. In
particular, two prominent 1984 films helped revitalize China's
film industry, and even propelled it to international attention.
Chen Kaige's The Yellow Earth (Huang tudic5' and Zhang
Junzhao's One and Eight (Yige yu bage)"2 "dazzled film critics
with their inventive cinematography, striking images, and
ingenious reworking of the contents of orthodox revolutionary
Chinese cinema."53 Like the many Fifth Generation films to
come, these two films were appreciated both by foreign critics
and avante-garde Chinese critics. However, the films enjoyed
neither high sales nor wide distribution within China."
47. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 28, at 118.
48. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 328.
49. See id.
50. See Pang Yangjie & Li Shanquan, Building Socialist Spiritual Civilization,
BEIJING REV., May 2, 1983, at 16.
51. YELLOW EARTH (Guanxi Film Studios 1984). "A poetic tale of a 12-year old
peasant girl and a Communist soldier," The Yellow Earth marked the beginning
of the Fifth Generation era of filmmakers. Edward Guthmann, Clear-Eyed
Visions of a Better China-Chen Kaige Angers Beying Again with Tragic Temptress
Moon, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 1997, at 58.
52. ONE AND EIGHT (1983).
53. Zha, supra note 9, at 143.
54. See id. at 143-44.
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With the success of these films, particularly The Yellow
Eartfs foreign acclaim, Beijing began exhibiting confusion as
to how to deal with "the novel phenomenon of ideas and
information flowing beyond China's borders as art, and
washing back as attention and acclaim."55 Watching directors
gain rapid fame overseas, the central authorities felt their
control over this aspect of China's culture and social
commentary slipping away. This indicates that China's strict
censorship has less to do with the content of individual films,
and more to do with the medium itself. At center is the
government's desire to control public perception of China,
particularly abroad; and film suddenly handed border-
transcending microphones to Chinese voices besides the
government's.
Besides the government's problems with the films, the
Fifth Generation's work was not much appreciated by China's
older school filmmakers, who viewed the newer films as
elitist. 6 Accessibility, however, has not been a high priority of
the Fifth Generation. Recognizing this, one prominent Fifth
Generation director, Tian Zhuangzhuang, has commented only
half jokingly that his films "were made for 21st - century
audiences."57 Regardless of tensions between old school and
new wave filmmakers, however, the new generation was
largely subsidized by state studios, which created the more
popular B movies."
Marguerite Gong Hancock observed in 1985 that it was
"uncertain whether the present style of modernization will be
able to keep the forces for cultural censorship and disruption
at bay."59 Indeed, the events of 1989 and the subsequent
cinematic climate of the 1990s have witnessed the forceful
backwards swing of the censorship pendulum.
55. Godfrey Cheshire, Chinese Checkers (filmmakers banned by Chinese
authorities), ILM COMMENT. July 1, 1994, at 65.
56. See Zha, supra note 9, at 144.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Hancock, supra note 5, at 329.
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The events of 198960 made artists and intellectuals run for
cover, bringing both mainstream and underground creative
and communication channels to a temporary halt. Once the
dust settled somewhat, China's already-struggling film
community had an even more difficult time resuming
production. Now, with the previously evolving liberalizations
sharply curtailed or even reversed, filmmakers had not only
less creative freedom, but even less state funding than
before."1
In 1991, the Chinese government took actions to revitalize
China's film industry. A special "film fund" was created in
order to garner percentages of box-office ticket sales.62 The
funds were to be used to promote China's film industry. Also,
many filmmakers were able to receive funds by producing
officially assigned projects, such as the plentiful 1991
"commemorative fims" celebrating the 70th Anniversary of the
founding of the CCP. 63 Another important move by the
government was to emphasize entertainment over ideology. In
the wake of bloody political demonstrations, Deng encouraged
people to focus on economic prosperity, rather than politics.
64
A mixed blessing for filmmakers, this meant not only that they
must not imbue their films with political content, but also that
they need not imbue their films with political propaganda.
Thus, filmmakers were now forced or free to focus on the
medium rather than the message, favoring form and style over
political content.
Some rhetoric continued to be espoused about the
educational'role of culture in society, but at the same time,
the leadership recognized that for Chinese filmmaking to hold
its own in the market-reform economy, it had to develop more
popular appeal. For example, in 1991, the CCP Politburo
member with the sensitive post of ideology chief, Li Ruihuan,
60. Specifically, the June 4, 1989 massacre of students and other
demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. See generally Lieberthal, supra
note 27.
61. SeeZha, supra note 9, at 144.
62. See China Adopts New Method to Charge Film Funds, XINHUA ENGLISH
NEWSWIRE, June 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10824298.
63. See Zha, supra note 9, at 145.
64. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 341.
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declared that party leaders should understand that an artistic
work must entertain first - otherwise it is pointless to attempt
to use it to educate people. Thus, film was to appeal to the
65masses in order to educate the masses.
According to Li:
[Lleaders had come to realize that the influence exerted by
the party must be subtle and imperceptible, and the people
should be influenced without being conscious of it. In order
to make socialist principles and moral virtues acceptable to
the broad masses, the party must learn to use cultural
forms that appeal to them.
o
.
Despite undertones of subliminal brainwashing, Li's
approach recognized that the Party had to back off from its
hit-people-over-the-head ideology, and instead convey its
message in terms to which people would listen. After all, as
people's options for amusement increased, the film industry's
captive audience shrank.6 ' As a result, China's film industry
has developed away from art films, and even farther away from
the ideological films of previous decades. Thrillers and urban
comedies have come to replace ideological films as the
mainstay of Chinese cinema.6"
D. Contemporary Chinese Filmmakers: The Sixth Generation
With the death of Deng Xiaoping, who ruled China during
the period of the Fifth Generation of filmmakers, the notion of
spiritual pollution became a greater focus for the CCP. To re-
accentuate the Party's dominance, Jiang and his cronies
reasserted the Party's control over the content and
dissemination of information. This emphasis was articulated
at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 14th Party Congress in
1992, where Party leaders made a pronouncement advocating
the promotion of model characters - typically average Chinese
citizens - that embody the "spirit of the times."69 After the
Session, the Central Propaganda Department promulgated
65. See Zha, supra note 9, at 120.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 145.
68. See id. at 145-46.
69. See Lisa Atkinson, What's Entertainment? The CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1997, at 38.
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eight regulations directed at the media to protect the Party's
image and the nation's stability. 70 Along with extensive
prohibitions on coverage, the regulations called upon the
propaganda departments of different levels to strengthen
censorship over the media and deal with problems promptly.7 '
Although directed at the media, the climate affected film
censorship as well.
Then, in the months leading up to the 15th Party
Congress in 1997, President and Party Secretary Jiang Zemin
launched a campaign promoting non-material values. In a
15,000-character manifesto entitled the "Construction of
Spiritual Civilization," the CCP documented the steps
necessary to recreate this spiritual civilization. The document
called upon officials to be 'soul engineers" who should
preserve the future of Chinese culture. In sum, the manifesto
called for increased political intervention in virtually every
aspect of popular culture, including film, television, and the
print media."7 2 Propaganda Department chief Ding Guang'en
acted upon these instructions by initiating a campaign to
stress "politics at every level., 73 Official newspapers "exhorted
Chinese citizens to emulate model citizens by buying Chinese
rather than foreign goods and watching politically correct
movies and television," thus promoting a dual policy of
uprightness as well as market protectionism.74 In addition,
Beijing capped the amount and type of foreign television
programming that could be aired, "strictly limiting the
broadcast time allotted to foreign programs."75 Internet access
was also limited. 76 "Beijing blocked 'subversive' Internet sites,
70. Intended to "guarantee unity of thinking," the eight regulations prohibit,
inter alia, coverage of "all cases which have a significant impact or wide
involvement," including coverage of the Diaoyu Islands controversy, Beijing
Municipal Party Committee former Secretary Chen Xitong, the overseas
democracy movement, and demonstrations in urban and rural areas. Further
Control over the Media, 4 CHINA Focus, Dec. 1, 1996, issue 12, available in 1996
WL 11751533.
71. See id.






ranging from home pages featuring pornography to websites of
standard Western newspapers like the Wall Street Journal,
though many of these restrictions have since been lifted."
77
Studio chiefs, along with editors and publishers, were
instructed to support current politics in their respective
endeavors."8 The result has been the production of a body of
"entertainment" that audiences think is anything but
entertainment.
In the last few years, major shakeups have taken place
within the bodies regulating film in China. In 1996, at the
same time China was relaxing its restrictions regarding foreign
film imports, the authorities were also tightening control over
China's twenty-nine state-run studios.79 Managerial and
financial responsibility of the state studios was assigned to a
single department within the Ministry of Radio, Film and
Television. 80  The consolidation appeared "aimed at
streamlining responsibility over the film sector by reducing the
number of bureaucratic players involved., 81 State-controlled
film studios underwent a wave of personnel changes.
Managers who were deemed lacking in socialist enthusiasm
were replaced by more ideological managers.8 2 "Beijing's hope
was that the reorganization would make it easier for many
debt-ridden state film studios to climb out of the red.,
83
Meanwhile, the censorship system stalled as censors stopped
approving scripts and started holding up films already in the
censorship pipeline.84
Currently, state financial support has been withdrawn
from the struggling official film studios, yet they must
continue to support a huge staff. Creatively, much of the top





81. Id. at 38.
82. See Tyler, supra note 18.
83. Atkinson, supra note 69, at 39.
84. See Tyler, supra note 18.
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advertising. 5 In order to survive financially, many Chinese
film studios have diversified their businesses into real estate,
restaurants, and other ventures.6 In addition to these
economic changes, a 1996 political reorganization at the top of
the Film Bureau has led to scripts being subjected to even
heavier scrutiny than before. This tightening of film
censorship is part of President Jiang Zemin's "spiritual
cleanup" of the arts.88
The lack of state funding, combined with increasing
political scrutiny, has posed a significant challenge to
contemporary filmmakers. "Struggling in the shadows of the
Fifth Generation's success," 9 only a small number of Sixth
Generation filmmakers have been able to scrounge enough
private funding to make small films on shoestring budgets.
This handful of Sixth Generation directors who have made
their own films somewhat inadvertently launched China's new
independent movement. In addition to feature films, the new
independent film scene includes documentaries. Young
filmmakers armed with minicams record and interpret
modern-day China by shooting quasi-documentaries that
address such topics as mothers of mentally retarded children,
veterans of the Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution, and
the daily workings of a Communist Party "neighborhood
committee" in Tibet.9" The documentaries are not meant as
anti-government agit prop, and do not focus on countering
repression, but are nonetheless frowned upon by the
authorities.9"
85. See generally, Zha, supra note 9, at 145 - 46.
86. See Brad Lee, Shanghai Film Festival Loses Star Billing Over Censorship,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13424905.
87. See Richard James Havis, Under Siege, ASIA TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997
available in 1997 WL 10404202. This spiritual cleanup campaign affected a
broad range of media. The Communist party closed down some publications and
fired editors who strayed from the party line. For further discussion of spiritual
clean up campaigns, see infra notes 169- 176 and accompanying text.
88. See id.
89. Zha, supra note 9, at 145-46.
90. See Lewis Beale, A Life More Ordinary than Banned-In Beiing, Works of
Wu Wenguang and Other Filmmakers Reveal the Everyday Realities of Today's
China, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 23, 1997, at 17.
91. See id.
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Films that the government has strongly promoted in the
last few years demonstrate how little the rhetoric and stated
priorities have changed since the Mao era. Ye Daying, director
of the domestically successful 1996 film Red Cherry (Hong
yingtao), has observed that "[tihere has never been pure art.
Of course the artists strive to pursue art, but one must always
serve the interests of the party and the state."92 His words as
well as his film harken back to Mao Zedong, who denied
separability of politics and art.93 Red Cherry is about children
of Chinese leaders and revolutionaries in Moscow during
World War II. 94 The children lived, studied and fought at the
Ivanov International Children's School from 1940 to 1945. 95
Ye's remarks might help explain why Red Cherry became one
of the most popular Chinese-produced films of 1996, and
especially why it won the most domestic awards for that year. 6
He acknowledges that "the Ministry of Propaganda controls
everything."97 Directors like Ye, who cede control to the central
authorities, go far in China.
Ye's recognition of who holds the reins of his projects
illustrates the widely-perceived arbitrariness of China's system
of censorship, as well as the sense of futility many directors
feel regarding compliance with the rules. Since government
officials often implement new rules not so much to further
development of the film system but to further their own status
within the party, the regulations may bear little relationship to
common notions of content and style.98 "TIe artists don't know
what can pass censorship and what cannot pass... Even
harmless films cannot be passed these days."99
92. Tyler, supra note 18.
93. See infra Part IB and accompanying text.
94. See Top '96 Film Events Announced in China, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE,
Jan. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3735627.
95. See id.
96. Red Cherry swept China's most prestigious film awards, including the
Golden Rooster Film Awards, the Hundred Flowers Film Awards, and the China
Huabiao Film Awards. See id.
97. Tyler, supra note 18.
98. See id.
99. Id.
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These days, however, the recognition that "there is no
pure art" springs more from cynicism than bygone
revolutionary ideals. Like their predecessors, the Sixth
Generation filmmakers combine art and politics, but with less
lofty optimism or airs of complex historical symbolism.
Instead, the Sixth Generation's films might be considered
more organically political, in the sense that people's very
existence is imbued with politics, even if there is no overt
background political event. This current generation of
filmmakers has placed on screen the moral ambiguity that has
pervaded 'Chinese society at least since the Cultural
Revolution. Tom between the Confucian pieties of China's
ancient culture and the materialistic ethics of the economic
reforms, Sixth Generation films embody the inherent but
sharpened conflicts of contemporary China. 100
II
The Laws, Regulations and Governmental Bodies That
Control Chinese Cinema
A. Government Bodies
China follows the Marxist view that a society has both an
economic basis and a "superstructure." The superstructure
includes entertainment, education, the mass media, and
anything directly related to "thought."'0' The Central
Propaganda Department, together with all the lower level
propaganda departments in the PRC, is responsible for
developing and maintaining the "superstructure" of society.0 2
100. Examples of fims that explore these themes include He Jianjun's The
Postman and Red Beads, and Wang Xiaoshuai's The Days. The Postman is a film
that explores urban despair and desolation and uses non-aesthetically pleasing
imagery. The Days treats life in modem China in a cynical fashion, while Red
Beads opts for philosophy and pychoanalysis over graphic images to express
moral ambivalence. See generally THE POSTMAN (United Frontline 1995); THE
DAYS (1993); RED BEADS (1993)




This chart depicts the structure of the regulatory bodies
involved in film production in China. As the arrows indicate,
their functions sometimes overlap.03
CCP ____C________&IC C P IG over=n eit
Propaganda State C ouncil Ministry of
D ep atment Culture
Ministry of 4 Ministry of Film
Propaganda Radio & Television
-State Film
Studios
As shown in the chart, currently State film studios must
answer to both the CCP and the Government through their
respective arms, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of
Propaganda, and the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television. 4
The overlap illustrates how film serves more as an extension of
the propaganda department in China than as a commercial
venture, let alone a form of artistic expression. 0 5
In March of this year at the Ninth National People's
Congress, the State Council announced a plan to eliminate
eleven of China's central ministries, including the Ministry of
Radio, Film and Television. 0 6 The latter ministry would shed
103. Chart modi fted from H.L. FU & RICHARD CULLEN, Media Law in the PRC 73
(Asia Law & Practice, 1996).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Sun Shangwu, Plan to Axe 11 Central Ministries, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 7,
1998, available at <http://www.chinadaily.net/cndy/history/dl -298.c07.html>.
The other ministries to be eliminated are the ministries of coal, power,
metallurgy, machine-building, electronics, chemistry, internal trade, posts and
telecommunications, forestry, and geology and mineral resources. This plan
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its power over the television network, and merge with other
ministries into one larger ministry under the State Council.
10 7
The restructuring is designed not only to cut down on
bureaucratic red tape, corruption, and heavy financial
burdens, but more fundamentally to bring the administrative
system in line with the market reforms.' 8 'The existing
institutional system was established under the former
planning economy and it obstructed the development of the
socialist market economy."" 9 Under the restructuring, the
government would be less directly involved in the production
and management of enterprises." This "revolution," as the
State Council called it, would allow the market to play its
intended fundamental role in resource allocation.'
The implications of this restructuring for the film industry
have not yet been widely examined, but if the new system
brings any of the improvements the State Council proposes,
filmmakers might find their projects handled more efficiently.
Perhaps the resulting administrative body in charge of film
censorship will have a significant number of other
responsibilities, so as to make nitpicking of film projects less
likely. Thus, filmmakers might benefit from a more
streamlined system because there may be fewer officials
looking over their shoulders.
In addition, if the new system does allow the market to
play a larger role in shaping the film industry, quality films
may prove themselves profitable and self-sustaining. This
could prove to the Chinese government that audiences yearn
for intelligent entertainment at least as much as they do for
more pedestrian fare. On the other hand, Chinese art
filmmakers may wind up disappointed in general audience
would reduce the number of central ministries from 40 to 29. In addition, the
number of government officials would be slashed in half. Four new ministries
would be established. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Luo Gan, State Councillor and Secretary-General of the State Council,
addressing the Ninth National People's Congress, Mar. 6, 1998, quoted in




tastes, as many independent film producers have been in the
West.
Of China's moviegoing population, perhaps only a
minority will patronize the serious films. Indeed, if the
restructuring means allowing the market to shape China's
struggling film industry, the government may withdraw any
remaining financial support it has been providing to the
industry. One can only wait and see whether China's film
industry will fail or flourish under the new structure, or
whether it will even be affected at all.
B. Legal Mechanisms
This section explains the articulated legal mechanisms
related to film censorship in China.
1. The Constitution
On its face, China's 1982 Constitution 12 would appear
amenable to protection of filmmaking against infringement by
the government. A closer reading of the document, together
with an analysis of Chinese constitutional theory and practice,
however, reveal that the pertinent constitutional provisions
have little more than symbolic value.
China's Constitution grants people the right to express
themselves, but it is far from an absolute right. Article 35
reads: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of
procession and of demonstration.""'
The first nebulous word to consider is "freedom." What is
significant is that "freedom" is used instead of the word "right"
in China's constitution. Rights are more legally enforceable
than freedoms, as freedom would probably be considered a
type of right. As director Zhang Yuan has noted, 'This word
freedom is very hard to understand ... I'm free here [in
112. P.R.C. CONST., (adopted Dec. 4, 1982 by the Fifth Session of the Fifth
National People's Congress.).
113. IA art35.
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Beijing] now, but I can't make films. I'm free, but I can't leave
the country."
'1 4
The Chinese word for speech, as used in the Constitution,
is a combination of the Chinese characters for "word" (yan)
and "opinion" or "theory" (lun)." 5 Together the word yanlun is
defined as "expression of one's political views."" 6 With such a
seemingly broad definition of speech, a definition that
recognizes political content, how can the government justify
rampant censorship?
First, China's restrictions on cinematic speech might be
explained through a specific reading of other words in Article
35. As is true throughout the Constitution, this article states
that the freedoms listed apply to "citizens."' 17 In contrast to
U.S. law, which sometimes considers corporations to be legal
"persons" for certain purposes, China would not consider film
studios to be citizens for purposes of enjoying speech rights."8
As a corollary, anyone making a film for a studio would not
necessarily enjoy these rights.
Second, the authorities might apply a sort of expresio
unius reading to the freedoms listed, so that the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another. Under this reading, the
fact that the Constitution specifically lists the freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, association, procession, and
demonstration might indicate that freedom of expression in
other forms is not protected." 9 Under this reading, freedom of
artistic creation is probably not included.
Although the constitution does not grant meaningful
speech rights, it does. purport to promote certain speech-
dependent activities. Article 22 declares that "[tlhe state
promotes the development of literature and art, the press,
broadcasting and television undertakings, publishing and
114. Quoted in Andrew Higgins, GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 1997, at T006, available in
1997 WL 2394011.
115. P.R.C. CONST., supranote 112.
116. THE PINYIN CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 793 (1979) [hereinafter CHINESE-
ENGLISH DICTIONARY].




distribution services, libraries, museums, cultural centers and
other cultural undertakings, that serve the people and
socialism, and sponsors mass cultural activities."2 ° Certain
built-in escape valves, however, prevent this article from
holding much water. Although this provision would seem to
bode well for the cooperation between the government and the
"art" or "cultural undertaking" of filmmaking, state promotion
of the activity is strictly conditional. The escape valve for the
government is the clause "that serve the people and
socialism.'' 21 This phrase provides a catch-all excuse to censor
or ban a film, because any content, style, or method the
government finds objectionable can be deemed not in the
service of the people and socialism.
Article 33 further conditions the exercise of rights on the
simultaneous fulfillment of duties. 122 "Every citizen enjoys the
rights and at the same time must perform the duties
prescribed by the Constitution and the law."'123 The "duties
prescribed by law" include the Four Basic Principles, which in
effect trump Constitutional articulations of freedom of
speech.'24 The Four Principles were officially established in the
Sixth Plenary Session, and are the guiding slogan of Deng
Xiaoping:
1. Uphold Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought.
2. Uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
3. Uphold the people's democratic dictatorship.
4. Uphold the leading role of socialism. 
25
These four principles, known as the "Four Upholds,"
became "the standard against which to measure thought,
speech, and action, as well as any artistic product.'
26
Accordingly, only those filmmakers who fulfill their obligation
120. P.R.C. CONST., art. 22.
121. See id.
122. Id., art. 33.
123. Id.
124. Professor James V. Feinerman, Chinese Law Seminar (Spring, 1996)
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to adhere to the Four Upholds will enjoy a concomitant "right"
to make their films and receive favorable treatment by the
censors. 127
Given the careful limits imposed on speech rights, one
would not expect China's constitution to articulate a right to
political speech. Yet Article 41 states that "Citizens of China
have the right to criticize and make suggestions to any state
organ or functionary.... No one may suppress such
complaints, charges and exposures, or retaliate against the
citizens making them."' 28 Although this Article does not
include its own limitation, like all rights in China's
Constitution this right is subject to the overriding caveat in
Article 51: 'The exercise of citizens ... of their freedoms and
rights may not infringe upon the interest of the state, of
society and of the collective or upon lawful freedoms and
rights of other citizens.' ' 29  This significant disclaimer,
conditioning the exercise of rights on the non-existence of
conflicting interests, arms the government with a catch-all
justification for not recognizing what otherwise would be
considered "rights." Thus, if a film is deemed to infringe on
State interests, for example by portraying the State in a
negative light, the authorities could easily find justification for
censorship under this provision. 1
30
Perhaps most important in deciphering the parameters of
the filmmaking freedom in China is the understanding that
interpretations of rights operate retroactively and in a fluid
context.' 3' 'The degree to which citizens may exercise rights
shifts in response to historical and social change, as well as to
the demands of duties, on a situation-by-situation basis."32
Because the parameters of rights shift according to context,
an official determination that a person, such as a filmmaker,
has incorrectly evaluated those parameters can result in
127. See id.
128. P.R.C. CONST., art. 41.
129. Id., art. 51.
130. For an application of this idea, see infra note 363 and accompanying
text.
131. SeeANDREW NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY 300 (1985).
132. Id.
19991
sudden censorship of material that had seemed acceptable in
a prior context, or worse, sudden banning of the filmmaker for
operating in a manner that was not forbidden at the time. 1
33
Under the Chinese Constitution, such action would not
even be recognized as inconsistent, because what serves the
state's interests is presumed to serve the individual's.'34 Thus
the constitution assumes a harmony of interest between state
and citizens, and neither encourages nor even recognizes the
possibility of conflict between the two. 1
3 5
2. The Film Administration Regulations
Frustrated by decades of unpredictable and opaque
decisions made by censors, by 1994 filmmakers themselves
began calling for a film law. 131 Such a law, they hoped, would
end abuses under the existing system of decisions by
individual officers whose whims were taking too brutal a toll
on filmmakers as policies changed with every fluctuation in
the political barometer. ' 7 Much like ongoing negotiations that
never culminate in a handshake, the constantly shifting
standards of the government kept the filmmakers perpetually
worried and guessing. 13 If the filmmakers knew what was
proscribed, they could either obey or not. An articulated film
law, they hoped, would steady the official attitude toward film
and clarify the parameters of film production. '
Some Chinese leaders agreed that such a law was
desirable, and supported the early promulgation of legislation
relating to film censorship. Gao'Honghu, chair of the Chinese
Film Artists' Association, was quoted by Xinhua as saying that




136. See Josephine Ma, Filmmakers Call for Law to Regulate Censorship,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 15, 1994, at 9.
137. See id.
138. Regarding the constant changes occurring in the nation's capital,
flmmaker Tian Zhuangzhuang has commented, "I worry about Beijing as if it's a
woman that's getting plastic surgery all the time." Quoted in Phillip Lopate, Odd
Man Out: Tian Zhuangzhuang, FILM COMMENT, July 1, 1994, at 60.
139. Ma, supra note 136.
Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. [Vol. 21:239
CENSORSHIP IN CHINESE CINEMA
inconsistency of decisions governing film censorship and
called for legislation to lay down clear standards.4 ' "Under the
present censoring system, there are a lot of irregularities and
they will do more harm than good to the development of the
industry.' 14 1 "Legislation," Gao said, 'Vill eliminate the
individual factor."142 One of his suggestions was that the law
should categorize films as "allowed to be shown," "encouraged
to be shown," and "banned." 43 A member of the standing
committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), Xie Tieli,
said in response that he would formally propose such a law to
the NPC in 1995.14
Not everyone supported promulgation of such a law,
however. For example, a spokesperson for China's Ministry of
Radio, Film and Television criticized Xie's proposal as
"unfair.",45 Gao's proposal, he noted, failed to consult what he
called the Ministry's already clear standards based on the
Constitution.'46 As discussed above, the Constitution provides
little guidance on content and standards.
When the government promulgated its first film laws in
1996, it turned out not to be what the filmmakers had had in
mind when they called for a film law years before. 147 The Film
Administration Regulations not only tightened censorship, but
they also outlawed independent productions.
China's first set of State regulations of film management,
the Film Administration Regulations 560(96.06. 19),148 were
promulgated on June 19, 1996, and took effect on July 1,
1996. Called "the most vigorous move so far to guarantee the
prosperity of China's film industry and to protect intellectual









148. Translated and reprinted in CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Sept. 1996, at 8
[hereinafter 1996 Film Regulations].
149. State Regulations Target Films, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSwIRE, June 29,
1999]
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the government oversight of filmmaking through the stages of
script approval, production, editing, and distribution.
The regulations were indeed designed to bolster the
government's control over fllmmaking, not to promote
experimentation and creativity. Liu Jianzhong, Director of the
Film Bureau under the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television,
explained that the regulations were needed in a time when the
country's film industry was facing increasing problems of film
copyright piracy, smuggling of audiovisual products, and a
growing amount of pornography.'5 ° Because China's own film
industry was suffering less from piracy than were foreign film
companies, Liu's stated purpose for the regulations was
probably intended to appease countries like the United States,
which had been pressuring China to tighten its control over
piracy. Article 31 requires film importers to obtain a license
from the owners of film copyrights and to use the films within
the licensed scope, and Article 44 adds that such a license is
also needed if a film is to be used for the production of audio
or video products."'
Not even Xinhua attempted to distort the aim of the
Regulations. Rather than running one of their typically sunny
headlines designed for foreign readers, the China Daily
headline read bluntly, "State Regulations Target Films.' 5 2
Although the regulations contain very few provisions dealing
with intellectual property, apparently the authorities hoped
Westerners' desire for Chinese intellectual property laws
would be satisfied.
The Regulations introduce a film censorship scheme; ban
certain content; regulate the import, export, distribution and
screening of films through licensing and registration; protect
freedom in film production; promote the development of the
film industry by funding; and impose penalties on parties
breaching the Regulations. '  Of course, the provisions
intended to protect freedom of film production and
1996, available in 1996 WL 10826164.
150. See id.
151. 1996 Film Regulations, supra note 148, arts. 31 & 44.
152. See Xinhua, supra note 149.
153. See generally 1996 Film Regulations, supra note 148.
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distribution rights are likely to be enforced selectively.
Accordingly, any protections in the Regulations probably
would not operate to protect disfavored films, and restrictions
are more likely to be eased for favored films.
A couple of months after promulgation of the Film
Regulations, China's Ministry of Radio, Film and Television
tried to emphasize what subject matter is impermissible. The
Ministry issued a circular forbidding the broadcast of any
program depicting "low-class" themes or "bad ideas."'' 4 These
directions hardly clarified the matter, though they probably
refer to base content such as pornography and violence,
known in Chinese vernacular as "fists and pillows.' 5 5 The
China Culture Press, in September 1996, urged citizens to "be
alert to the danger of violent content in films and TV plays."'56
In an effort to rouse people from desensitization to violence,
the warning noted that while most people are ashamed of
pornographic images on the screen, they are less sensitive to
the violent ones.5 7 Not only did the circular call for increased
sensitization to violence, but also to scariness: "Action should
be taken to remove the frightening scenes from the screen."'58
These guidelines are difficult to reconcile with China's eager
import of such highly violent movies as True Lies,'59 which is a
Schwarzenegger action flick that showcases some frightening
scenes. 
60
Article 2 stipulates that the regulations apply to
activities involving the production, import, export,
distribution and screening of films as seemingly
diverse in nature as features, documentaries, science
education films, cartoons, puppet films, and films on
special subjects. 6 '
154. See Tom Korskl, Warning Focuses on Violence in Films, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Sep. 24, 1996, at 8.
155. See Kim Gordon, China: Raising the Red Flag, (Reuter Textline Broadcast,
Apr. 7, 1995), available in LEXIS: China Country Files.
156. Korski, supra note 154, at 8.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. TRUE LIES (20th Century Fox 1994).
160. See id.
161. See 1996 Film Regulations, supra note 148, art. 2.
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* Article 22 requires processing and post-production of
films shot by film production work units or jointly shot
by Chinese and foreign parties to be completed in
China. 
162
* Article 23 stipulates that films may not be distributed,
screened, imported or exported without having been
censored by the authorities.'63
* Article 31 requires film importers to obtain a license
from the owners of film copyrights and to use the films
within the licensed scope.'64
* Article 44 adds that such a license is also needed if a
film is to be used for the production of audio or video
products. 165
" Article 45 provides that the amount of time for which a
screening work unit screens Chinese-made films in a
year should not be less than two-thirds of the total
amount of the screening time in that year. In other
words, foreign films must not constitute more than
one-third of the total screening time on Chinese
screens each year. This articulated proportion meant
to cut back on the number of imported films that had
been "invading" Chinese theaters.' 6
The "final court of appeal" for any filmmaker who
disagrees with official rulings is the Ministry itself. 67 Thus just
as there is no independent judiciary to which persons whose
speech rights have been infringed can appeal,'68 there is no
independent body to which a filmmaker can turn to appeal a
censorship decision. Lack of appeal to a separate forum
162. See id. art. 22.
163. See id. art. 23. The authorities that conduct the censorship include an
"Important Issues Committee," comprised of approximately thirty elders from the
Communist Party. Filmmaker Mabel Cheung blamed this committee for
squabbling with her depiction of Chiang Kaishek in her historical film, The
Sisters Three. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
164. See icL art. 31.
165. See icL art. 44.
166. See i art. 45.
167. See Ma, supra note 136.
168. See RANDLE R. EDWARDS, LOUIS HENKIN, & ANDREW NATHAN, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CHINA 26 (1986).
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inherently stacks the deck against any filmmaker seeking
review of censorship practices.
Some people voiced concern that in setting screening time
limit in Article 45, Beijing was trying to prevent "cultural
infiltration.' 169 Spiritual clean-up campaigns, with China's
Cultural Revolution as the most extreme example, are
characteristic of Chinese politics. 170
The spiritual clean-up campaigns of the early 1990s
created as much uncertainty among filmmakers as ever as to
what content was and was not acceptable. Among the arts,
film censorship has been particularly stringent. Zhang Yimou
observed, "[ildeologically and spiritually, people today
experience massive control. This is especially severe in the
case of films. In music, painting and literature the pressure is
much less."' 7' He further offered an explanation for the harsh
treatment of film: "Film is something special because it
reaches so many people. That is why the authorities are
especially tough. 17 1 Indeed, film can surmount abstractions
common to media such as to literature by illustrating the
ideas with moving characters. Such immediacy can be quite
powerful, because it "allows the viewer to more readily identify
with the victim and thus makes it more likely that someone
sitting in the movie theater will be moved to action ..... ,173 It is
169. See Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Foreign film cuts 'won't affect imports,' SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, July, 7, 1996, at 5.
170. See Lieberthal, supra note 27 at 111-19. During China's "Great
Proletariat Cultural Revolution," which spanned the decade from roughly 1966 to
1976, Mao Zedong led a violent political assault on China's cultural traditions
and on party officials suspected of disloyalty. The late 1960s saw the most
dramatic and violent purges, when Mao instigated the Red Guard youth
movement to raid houses, bum books and antiques, beat and humiliate people,
and kill those who tried to resist. See id.
171. Quoted in Censorship on Rise in China, Filmmaker Zhang Yimou Says,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News & Analysis File.
Zhang has said censorship is on the rise in China, and is more severe in film
than in music, painting, and literature. See ic
172. Id.
173. Quoted in Jeremy Lehrer, Bringing Abuses to Light: The Human Rights
Watch International Film Festival Focuses the Public Eye on Human Rights
Abuses, 24 HUMAN RIGHTS 14, 14 (1997). One of the films shown at the 1997
Human Rights Watch International Film Festival was a documentary about
Chinese labor activist Wei Jingsheng.
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just this sort of inspiration that the Chinese government fears
most.
The 1997 campaign, however, marked the first time this
type of propaganda explosion had taken place since China
opened its markets to foreign products. Accordingly, when
President Jiang Zemin launched his "spiritual clean-up"
campaign in a backlash against foreign "bourgeois" ideas,
foreign films and other media were attacked as a threat to
traditional Chinese values.'74 After a reorganization at the top
of the Film Bureau, the film industry along with other media
was instructed by the Propaganda Department to promote
"model characters - typically average Chinese citizens - that
embody the 'spirit of the times,""75 Official, as well as non-
official, filmmakers are subject to the regulations. Anything
considered socially unhealthy is declared forbidden, such as
adulterous behavior or even long kisses. 176 "In practice
[however] filmmakers [can] get around the more ludicrous
edicts if the overall tone of the story line is sufficiently
'moral.'"177
It "comes as no surprise that Beijing's latest attempts to
favor ideologically correct Chinese-produced entertainment
over foreign offerings seem to have backfired. Beijing's
preferences notwithstanding, and although certain state
studio-made films do quite well, 178 as in many Asian countries
174. Jiang probably launched this campaign in order to strengthen his
popularity with the hardliners. See Mary Kay Magistad & Jackie Lyden, Chinese
Cinema from Beiing (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 14, 1997).
175. The Propaganda Department's instruction was consistent with the
pronouncement made at the sixth plenary session of the 14th Party Congress in
1992. Atkinson, supra note 69, at 39. One of the examples used by Jiang Zemin
was a cartoon series produced by the Shanghai Animation Film Studio. He
praised the cartoon because it was based on the deeds of famous young heroes
of China and other countries. See Highlights of Today's Major Bejing Based
Newspapers XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, Jan. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL
5569730.
176. See Richard James Havis, No End Yet to the Big Chill: Creativity is stifled
but all is not lost in China, ASIAWEEK, Feb. 27, 1998, at 38.
177. Id.
178. An example of a domestic movie that did very well in China in 1996 is
Trials of Strength, a large-scale documentary film about "the war to resist U.S.
aggression and aid Korea (1950-53). Trials of Strength reportedly set a box-office
record in Guangzhou and other cities. See Top '96 Film Events Announced in
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foreign films continue to outperform their domestic
counterparts at the box office, and Chinese domestic film
production has dropped dramatically."'79 Additionally, these
latest strictures have resulted in falling state subsidies, stalled
productions, and slack box office returns, plunging the
Chinese film industry into its worst recession since 1989.180
Audiences tend to pass over the official studios' stodgy
propaganda in favor of arcades, karaoke bars, bowling alleys,
and go-cart tracks. 8'
The promulgators of the 1996 Film Regulations, however,
denied the rule requiring at least two-thirds of screening time
be devoted to domestic films was motivated by the culture
campaign. They also denied that there had been any new
instruction from the State Council or the Propaganda
Department on any policy change concerning importing
foreign movies.' 2 Rather, officials explained that at present the
percentage of foreign movies was slightly over one-third, and
the aim was simply to reduce that percentage, not to
drastically restrict the number of movies imported into
China. 183
In light of the officials' further elaborations, however,
allegations of their fear of cultural infiltration do seem
accurate. For example, some films would be excluded due to
violent content. "As we are paying increasing attention to the
country's law and order, we become more cautious of the
negative impact of violent crime scenes in foreign movies.''
84
Further comments indicated even more restrictive content
bars. Films, they explained, "are imported to expose audiences
to foreign science and technology, customs and culture; films
that promote separatism or interference in China's sovereignty
would be banned."'8" 5 Such a statement clearly indicates
China, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWiRE, Jan. 9, 1997 available in 1997 WL 3735627.
179. Atkinson, supra note 69, at 40.
180. See Havis, supra note 176, at 38.
18 1. See James Harding, Not Satisfied With Success in Subtitles, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at 3 (interviewing filmmaker Zhang Yimou).






exclusion of films on content and ideological grounds, not
based on market share.
A China film official attempted to justify such censorship
by pointing to the fact that China's film system does not use
ratings.'86 Because China had no oversight of the film during
production, the idea goes, the government must be able to
scrutinize the finished products for appropriateness. The
difference between this type of censorship and a ratings
system, of course, is that while a rating system such as that of
the United states assigns a rating according to what type of
audience seems suited to that film, under China's system, the
censors may decide no appropriate audience exists.
3. Definitions
Certain fundamental definitional questions follow from
these regulations as well as from China's film practices. For
example, just what does "censor" or "banned" mean in the
Chinese context?
a. "Censor"
The English word "censor" conjures up images of the word
stamped prominently across a document, indicating that it is
not fit to be read or seen. However, the term might have
different connotations in China, to the legislators, the
filmmakers, and the general populace. Thus to understand
Chinese censorship practices, it is necessary to examine how
they refer to them. Although Chinese regulations cannot be
subjected to the same type of statutory analysis common to
United States legislation, looking both at the Chinese word for
censorship as used in the statute, as well as the practices the
film authorities have employed before and after the regulations
were enacted, we can start to discern what "censorship"
means in China.
As used in the statute, the Chinese word for the verb
censor is "shencha." In the Chinese-English section of the
Oxford dictionary, "shencha" means "to examine or
investigate," and sometimes "censorship" is used
186. See id.
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interchangeably with "approval" or "editing."1 87 Already this
differs from the English definition of censorship, which more
specifically includes "to examine in order to suppress or delete
anything considered objectionable."188 Although the Chinese
"shencha" as formally defined lacks the negative, suppressive
element that English attaches to "censor," in Chinese the
concept of "examination" can itself be quite grueling. What the
comparison does show is that to the Chinese, "censorship" is a
process, not a result, and that censorship is embarked upon
without the inherent purpose of suppressing or deleting.
Accordingly, submitting a project for censorship in China does
not guarantee that the film will be suppressed or cut.
b. "Banned"
What does it mean when a filmmaker is "banned" by
Chinese authorities? "Being banned in China may not be as
bad as it sounds."18 9 Generally, it has meant that the
filmmaker is prohibited from making films for five years.1
90
Sixth Generation director Tian Zhuangzhuang suffered this
prohibition after making his internationally renowned film,
The Blue Kite, in 1994.1'' Set in the 1950s, The Blue Kite'
92
depicts that politically tumultuous decade from the viewpoint
of a mischievous young boy. Idealism for China's future under
Communism gets eroded by the Party's capricious injustices
toward his ordinary extended Chinese family.
The indictment is made even more damning by the
characters' inability to challenge openly, or even to lose faith
in, the system that is rolling over and crushing them. In a
187. See id.
188. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcrIoNARY (1987). Black's Law
Dictionary elaborates with its definition of "censorship": "Review of publications,
movies, plays and the like for the purpose of prohibiting publication,
distribution, or production of material deemed objectionable as obscene,
indecent or immoral." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (6th ed., 1990).
189. Beth Accomando & Bob Edwards, China and Film (NPR radio broadcast,
Nov. 20, 1997).
190. Telephone interview with Luo Jianfan, formerly a playwright with the
China Youth Art Theatre in Beijing (Apr. 10, 1998):
191. THE BLUE KITE (Longwick Film 1993) For details on circumstances of The




movie that never shouts, didactically or otherwise, it is left
to the spectator to total up the sufferings and experience the
full outrage. 
193
Tian was one of seven young Sixth Generation filmmakers
China banned in one sweep. A March 12 notice issued by the
Ministry of Radio, Film and Television announced a ban on
Tian Zhuangzhuang (The Blue Kite, The Horse ThieJ,194 Zhang
Yuan (Beying Bastards),'95 Wu Wenguang (Bumming in
Bejing),96 Wang Xiaoshuai, He Jianjun (The Postman, Red
Beads),97 Ning Dai, and the collective Structure, Wave, Youth,
and Film Group.' 98 The government sent out the following
directive to the country's sixteen official film studios,
processing labs, equipment rental services and other film-
related offices, notifying them of the ban: "Any units that
discover the participation of the above-mentioned filmmakers
in the production of a film, television programme or video
must dismiss them, otherwise approval for the film will be
withdrawn." 99
The ban followed what the Ministry called the "illegal
participation" of the directors in the Rotterdam Film Festival
that February. The illegal aspect of the directors' participation
in the festival stemmed from the films having circumvented
the censors when sent to the festival.2 0 One of the banned
directors, Zhang Yuan, called the ban "outrageous," and
compared it to telling him that he "can't eat or sleep."
20
'
The Ministry defended the ban as necessary to "correct
wrongdoing in the film industry."20 2 This action left the seven
directors in limbo and sent a chill through the industry. Yan
Xiaoming, a ministry official, said "if independent filmmakers
wanted the public to see their movies then they should go
193. Lopate, supra note 138, at 60.
194. THE HORSE THIEF (Xlan Film Studio 1986))
195. BEIJING BASTARDS (Independent 1993))
196. BUMMING IN BEIJING
197. RED BEADS (Independent 1993)
198. See Geoffrey Crothall, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 26, 1994, at 7.
199. See Cheshire, supra note 55; see also Crothall, supra note 198.
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through 'normal channels,' rather than trying to circumvent
government organizations by sending their work directly to
foreign film festivals."20 3 Stressing that the "Ministry was not
attempting to limit artistic expression and would 'strongly
support' experimental filmmakers, as long as they remain
within the law."
204
Based on this explanation, the Chinese government's
objection to some of these art films apparently has less to do
with content than with process, and perhaps also with the
proverbial "face" lost by Chinese officials when they lose
control over films made in China. The timing of the 1994
events reinforces this idea: China banned the seven directors
and issued the film industry directives against them within
weeks after United States Secretary of State Warren
Christopher's flummoxed mission to Beijing, 20 5 and within the
201
same week that The Blue Kite premiered in U.S. theaters.
Perhaps the most telling evidence that the authorities use
bans not to target films themselves but to make political
statements is that "banned" films are not necessarily blocked
from screening in China. For example, during the period in
which Zhang Yimou's To Live 7 was supposedly banned, a
poster of the film was displayed on the marquis of a movie
theater in a Shanghai neighborhood full of high-ranking
communist officials. 2 8 Although such advertising does not
prove that the film did eventually screen there, it does indicate
an attempt by theater authorities to generate interest in the
film. Thus, had Chinese officials truly not wanted domestic
audiences to see the film, such posters would not have gone
up. In addition to the publicity the film enjoyed in Shanghai,
To Live was actually shown in Xi'an, also during the time it
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Elaine Sciolino, Slowly, Christopher's Talks in Beiing Come to an
End, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1994, atA3.
206. See Cheshire, supra note 55, at 65.
207. To LIVE (ERA International/Shanghai Film Studio 1994).
208. When asked about the display, the managers of the Paradise Theater
reportedly mumbled something about the film "coming soon." Rone Tempest,
Zhang: Still at the Heart of Chinese FYimmaking, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at 1.
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was supposedly banned. 20 9 Thus, despite the formal meaning
of "banned," sometimes it is no more than lip service.
III
External Censorship Factors
Beyond the individualized factors that influence whether a
particular film will be approved and produced, certain factors
that have nothing to do with the specific filmmaker or content
of a film also influence censorship decisions. Cultural codes,
economics and international diplomacy are the most
prominent of these external factors.
A. Cultural Codes
Formal laws and regulations play only a limited role in
China's film industry. Film regulation instead relies heavily on
political-managerialism, secondary regulations, ad hoc notices
and administrative practice.21 In addition, cultural codes
come into play.
1. Li and Fa
For example, one reason China does not have more
transparent censorship laws to guide its filmmakers is China's
traditional preference for relying on 1i rather than fa.21' While 1i
relies on propriety and moral force to guide behavior, fa
emphasizes force and law.21 2 Li requires people to adjust their
views and demands in order to accommodate the needs and
desires of others, and thus yield to others for the sake of
harmony when confrontation and conflicts arise. Concessions
are expected from each side. In the context of film festivals, for
example, 1i creates the expectation that filmmakers will bow
out in order to preserve national "face." This is one plausible
explanation for the government's preventing Zhang Yimou
from attending the 1995 New York Film Festival, where his
209. See id. (quoting Zhang Yimou).
210. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 28, at 15.
211. See Feinerman, supra note 124.
212. See CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 116, at 183, 418.
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Shanghai THad' 3 had failed to capture a nomination in the
foreign-language category.
Similarly, the Chinese authorities may have been trying to
preserve a certain image of China when they pulled Zhang's
recent film Keep Cool (You Hua Hao Hao Shuo) from the
Cannes Film Festival.214 Unlike Zhang's previous films, this
one does not feed the Western taste for exotic old China, and
instead exposed certain unattractive social realities of
contemporary China.
This notion of Li also prevents individual filmmakers from
protesting censorship decisions. Working with the censors to
seek more favorable treatment is preferable to challenging
their decisions on principle in order to protect one's own
interests. Li thus causes censorship practices to be addressed
through compromise and mediation framed in terms of the
circumstances of individual films and filmmakers, rather than
in terms of bright-line standards handed down by the
government.
Lfs role in Chinese film censorship might be best analyzed
by reference to the Confucian teaching "Govern the people by
regulations, keep order among them by chastisements, and
they will flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them
by moral force, keep order among them by ritual, and they will
keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord.
21 5
Under this idea of keeping order by ritual, the censorship
process might constitute a form of ritual, as opposed to law.
Filmmakers participate in the ritual conducted by the
government, such that the whole process, seems more
voluntary.
On the other hand, the Chinese authorities seem to resort
to fa when the "law" or "punishment" is for show to outsiders,
particularly Westerners. This is because the government leans
heavily on f 216 to reinforce its authority when it has no ability
213. SHANGHAI TRIAD (Sony Pictures Classic 1995).
214. KEEP COOL (Guanxl Film Studio 1997).
215. CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECS 88 (Arthur Waley Trans., Bradford & Dickens
3d ed. 1949).
216. Although fa has become a synonym for punishment, since pre-imperialist
days the ideogram has multiple meanings, including law, model, method,
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to rule by li. In the international context, cultural moral
suasion tends not to carry beyond a nation's borders, so the
retributive force of fa is considered more effective.217
In this way, 1i and fa may be comparable to the notions of
"prior restraint," and. its counterpart, "subsequent
punishment," customarily used in reference to the press in the
United States. Prior restraint includes any scheme that
empowers public officials to deny expression in advance." 8
Like li, prior restraint emphasizes deflection of the disfavored
act, as opposed to subsequent punishment, which emphasizes
retribution after the act is committed.""9 Whereas under
United States law, any system of prior restraint is presumed
unconstitutional, prior restraint is inherent in China's system
of censorship.
China's censors scrutinize Chinese-made films from their
inception, and can halt the project and prevent the
"expression" as they wish. Although guidelines and directions
are provided as to each step in film production, editing,
release, and distribution, compliance with such provisions
does not necessarily seem to prevent subsequent punishment.
As discussed below, the authorities may well find reasons to
ban the film or filmmaker, even after tacitly approving the
project a number of times along the way. For this reason,
China's system of censorship is somewhat of a hybrid of 1i and
fa, of prior restraint and subsequent punishment. The
authorities try to rely on 1i and prior restraint until a film
leaves their hands for distribution, then resort to fa and
subsequent punishment if the filmmaker impermissibly
distributes the film, such as to foreign film festivals.
technique, rule and regulation. See BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, THE WORLD OF THOUGHT
IN ANCIENT CHINA 321-22 (1985).
217. See id. at 323.
218. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990).
219. Fu & Cullen, supra note 28, at 48. As used here, "prior restraint" refers
to the classic notion of pure executive control of the medium, rather than the
judicially crafted meaning that has evolved in the United States, which inversely
means prohibition of prior restraint. The difference in the two uses means that
whereas in the U.S., the doctrine of prior restraint has developed to guard the
citizenry from excessive regulation of freedom of expression, in China prior
restraint is one approach the government takes to regulate expression. Id. at 66.
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While the Chinese government seems to opt for
"subsequent punishment" of its most prominent filmmakers, it
also wields a significant amount of literal prior restraint on the
artists themselves. For instance, Gong Li, the most sought-
after Chinese actress, has complained that "every time I
perform outside China, I have to seek approval."2"' In contrast,
if China's government opted for prior restraint, the result
would likely be that no films would be produced that would be
presented to the censors at all. In effect, China's government
implicitly approves a dual market: the officially-recognized
avenues of film production as well as the "subculture." Ever
market-wary, the government thereby guarantees an
acceptable number of films will be made. Depending on how
badly China might need some international awards, certain
art films may or may not be released. The decision has little to
do with their content.
2. Guanxi
Another cultural notion that helps shed light on China's
film censorship is guanxi, which refers to personal
relationships or connections.221 Guanxi has a strong presence
in commercial and bureaucratic as well as interpersonal
relationships. Commonly understood to refer to being well-
connected, i.e., having friends in the right places, guanxi also
has larger ramifications. Rather than being bound by the
fetters of law as they appear in the written language of a
contract, the precise codifications of terms, or individual
rights or responsibilities; the Chinese traditionally prefer
flexibility in adjusting to unfolding circumstances in light of
220. China's star actress calls for less control on arts, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2067755.
221. See CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 116, at 248. As used in
conversation, "guanxr can also have a connotation of "significance" or
"consequence." For example, the phrase "mel guanxt' (literally "has no
connection") is commonly used in conversation as "It doesn't matter" or "no
problem," in response to apologies or expressions of casual concern. Reading
these two uses together, then, the implication of a person not having guanxi in
the sense of not being well-connected is that the person will have no significance
or consequence - that the person doesn't matter.
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the needs of their ongoing relationships.222 Reliance on
relationship over formal law, however, often leads to the
association of guanxi with a host of corrupt business
practices, and the opportunism, rent-seeking, and shirking
that are endemic in China's state industries and
administrative bureaucracies.223
Thus, in the film context, guanxi means not only that
better-connected filmmakers will find the censorship
procedures more amenable to their projects, but more
generally that the process itself will not be articulated in
formal laws or even guidelines.
B. Economics
Over the past decade, market reforms have caused
Chinese authorities as well as filmmakers to view films more
as commercial ventures. With this trend artistic expression
seems the motive of only a limited number of filmmakers.224
China has learned to Value its films according to box-office
profits more than for any other quality: "[Blox office income is
drawing the attention of government and film personnel as a
practical lever for value judgment. 225 Chinese films that match
the box office performances of Hollywood movies are especially
hailed because, according to Dou Shoufang, deputy director of
the Film Bureau of the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television,
"this at least proves that [Chinese] films are becoming worthy
to watch., 226 In reality, of course, strong box-office profits
prove only that audience-pleasing films are now making it
past the censors, consistent with Deng's policy of "entertain
them first."
222. It is this notion of relational flexibility "that has rankled foreign investors
in China since 1979 and has led to demands for transparency in trade
regulations." Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property
Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
1081, 1113, 1123, n.176 (1996).
223. On corruption in contemporary China, see Helen Kolenda, One Party,
Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control
It, 4 J. CHINESE L. 187 (1990).
224. See Lili, supra note 39, at 14.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 13.
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Although in the name of economic reform the authorities
have tried to make it easier for the studios to do business,
content remains firmly under the government's thumb. The
government generally justifies restrictive social policies with
the default excuse that China is still developing, and that tight
governmental control is thus necessary to facilitate
development.227 Zhang Yimou has observed, 'What you are
seeing is certainly an opening up of China, but this is taking
place only in the economic and consumer domain."228 Instead
of bringing about freer cinematic expression, economic
reforms have forced films to be weighed as much for their
entertainment value as for their educational value. 229 This
represents a major shift in paradigm: "To take entertainment
as a major function of a film posits an ideological challenge to
the traditional socialist requirement of cinema- that a film
must first and foremost be didactic."23 ° In this way, the
Chinese authorities may be allowing one Chinese maxim, that
film should elicit appreciation from both the simple and the
refined audience (yia xu kuo xian), to replace the previous
maxim, that film should follow mainstream ideology (zhu xuan
ying pian).
Echoing the Cultural Revolution, the authorities have
rationalized their emphasis on commercial entertainment by
couching it in populist terms. Whereas experimental and art
film serves only the elite minority of intellectuals,
entertainment film serves the masses. This view is consistent
with the socialist emphasis on mass appeal.231 Yet China's
227. For example, in reference to the August 1997 regulations banning private
homes from using satellite dishes and making it illegal for the country's
estimated 2,000 cable operators to beam foreign broadcasting to approximately
55 million homes, Director-general of the Foreign Affairs Department of China's
Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television stated, "Our country's current task is to
build the economy. We may [change the regulations] when China becomes
richer." Rose Tang, TV network gets through mainland's closed doors, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING Posr, Dec. 8, 1997, at 3.
228. AGENCE FRENCH PRESSE, supra note 171 (quoting Zhang Yimou).
229. See Jenny Kwok Wah Lau, 'Farewell My Concubine,' History, Melodrama,
and Ideology in Contemporary Pan-Chinese Cinema, FILM QUARTERLY, Sept. 1,
1995, at 18.
230. See id.
231. See id at 16. For a translation of some of these debates about
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measured transition from a socialist to a market economy has
necessitated updated justifications for the emphasis on
entertainment.
The dilemma is, of course, that as the censors keep
stepping in, production costs skyrocket, investors lose money,
and funding for future films dries up.232 As a result, China's
film studios continue to hurt for money and private investors
are increasingly less likely to back films that are the least bit
controversial.233
As some of the staunchest vestiges of China's once fully
socialist system, the studios each maintain an enormous staff,
with a large number of actors and directors sitting around
waiting for projects. In China's market reform-driven economy,
the authorities are trying to make it easier for the studios to
make money. The industry is using Hollywood as an example
of film's role in society: "Hollywood is well received all over the
world because it realized from the beginning that film itself is
not a refined art. Instead, it is little more than popular art,
and its basic function is entertainment."
23 4
For example, studios are now allowed to sell their films
directly to distributors in China, eliminating the monopoly of
the government's Chinafilm, which previously would buy films
from studios at a flat fee and then sell the films elsewhere.235
Sometimes this new direct marketing takes place back at the
script stage, as studios send copies of scripts to distributors
"so that they can evaluate market potential."23 6 Moreover, in a
bid to build its film industry into a Hollywood rival, China has
reported spending 26 billion yuan (approximately three million
entertainment versus experimental film in China, see FILM IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA: CRITICAL DEBATES, 1979-89 (George Semsel, et al. eds., 1993).
232. See NPR radio broadcast, supra note 174.
233. See id.
234. Professor Zheng Dongtian of the Beijing Film Academy, quoted in Lili,
supra note 39, at 15. Classical Hollywood cinema, in particular, has been held as
the model by some filmmaker theorists such as Shao Mujun and Hao Dazheng.
See Lau, supra note 229, at 16.
235. China Lifts Film-Import Quotas, Keeps Censorship, REUTERS, Apr. 18,
1995, available in LEXIS News File.
236. Zheng Quanguang, president of the China Film Co-Production
Corporation, quoted in Havis, supra note 176, at 38.
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dollars). That amount is just one percent of the budget of the
Hollywood blockbuster Titanic,237 which is currently sweeping
China and which is a film China would like to emulate.238
The government also encourages filmmakers to consider
the bottom line in producing films. For example, the Film
Bureau of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television has
encouraged filmmakers to be as sensitive as possible to the
earning potential of their products.239
Last year another experiment was undertaken, whereby
selected studios maintained the distribution rights to big
United States films. This is quite a lucrative arrangement, as
the ten United States films allowed into China each year tend
to be blockbusters, such as Toy Story2 40 or, more recently,
Titanic. This arrangement is supposed to channel the profits
from the distribution of U.S. films back into the local film
industry. However, creative freedom- not just money- is
necessary to make good film.
C. International Diplomacy
"[Clulture, as illustrated by film, is an accurate gauge by
which to monitor Chinese temperament and an effective
means of working toward political and economic goals."24' As a
particularly visible tool in the field of international diplomacy,
film has played an important role in China's international
relations, especially with the U.S. When U.S. Secretary of
State Madeline K. Albright made an official visit to China in
May of 1998, she was escorted around the Beijing Film Studio
by none other than director Chen Kaige, who screened for her
excerpts from his film Farewell My Concubine.242 Albright had
237. TITANIC (20 ' Century Fox/Lightstorm Entertainment/Paramount Pictures
1997).
238. Yan Buting, deputy director of China's Film Bureau, cited in China Aims
to make its own Titanic, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS
News & Analysis File.
239. See Lili, supra note 39, at 15 (interviewing Dou Shoufang, deputy
director of the Film Bureau of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television).
240. ToY STORY (Disney/Pixar 1995).
241. Hancock, supra note 5, at 351.
242. See Barton Gellman, Letter from China; Behind the Scenes and Between
the Lines, WASH. POST, May 5, 1998, at C1.
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specifically requested a meeting with Chen, ostensibly to make
a gentle point about artistic freedom, while avoiding any
offense to her Chinese hosts."'
The influence movies derive from and have upon China's
international relations stems from the importance film has
historically had in China's domestic politics. The PRC
leadership, under both Mao, Deng, and Jiang, has repeatedly
used film to consolidate domestic power and influence foreign
policy. Sporadically the U.S. has used films to bolster bilateral
relations with China in times of war as well as peace, and to
promote commerce."'
During the first several decades of cinema, China would
import foreign movies only after the purchase price fell,
leaving the audience with either propaganda films, or
extremely out-dated westerns. By the 1980s, as China's
economic reforms helped China afford foreign products such
as films, China relaxed its controls on film imports, mostly by
following "the pattern of overall diplomacy, with small private
deals preceding the implementation of formal cultural
accords."24 The U.S. film industry, for one, reacted to these
relaxations with euphoria, as many American films escaped
censorship. Soon enough, however, hard line Chinese policies
rejected the customary royalty fees of the U.S. companies,
replacing them with flat fees for each film purchased.24
243. According to her aides' Albright did want to make a subtle point about
artistic freedom. See id. Chen served as the ideal candidate for such a meeting,
because while his films have been subjected to strict censorship over the years,
he remains in good standing with the government. Thus he was a better
filmmaker to meet with than, for example, marginalized directors out of favor
with the government, because such a meeting would have too blatantly signaled
Albright's artistic freedom agenda
244. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 350.
245. Id. at 342. China's markets opened only partway to imported films, and
the government attempted to retain control over both selection and distribution
of the films. In addition, the government offered reviews of each film
accompanied by interpretations. For example, Charlie Chaplin's classic "Modern
Times" was praised for its "deep social significance," "superb art," and "rich
ideological content." PRC Film Director Comments on Charlie Chaplin Films,
XINHUA, Jan. 19, 1979.
246. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 342-43.
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In 1981, proud of its domestic films, China participated in
a film festival exchange with the United States The
performance of the Chinese films in the United States,
however, embarrassed China. "In contrast to the widespread
popular reception the American films received in China, the
Chinese films which toured the United States from October
1981 to January 1982 played to embarrassingly small
audiences. No lines waited outside theaters. In fact, the tour of
films went largely unnoticed."24 Although the U.S. government
offered explanations for the small turnout for the Chinese
films, such as competition from American films and other
entertainment, as well as reliance upon small distributors for
publicity, the Chinese disappointedly chose to blame the
u.s.
248
After four more years of Deng's "open door" policy, China
sent another one of its films for distribution overseas. The film
it selected, Xie Fei's A Hunan Girl [Xiangnu Xiao Xiao],
illustrates the messages about China that the government
wanted to export by way of cinema. With its turn of the
century setting, childhood marriage, adultery and injustice, A
Hunan Girl, the government figured, would introduce the
stringent feudal structures of "old" China to Western
audiences. The underlying message, of course, was that China
had progressed into a modern nation under Communism,
from those bad old pre-Communist feudalistic days.
Another of China's exports to the West was Red
Sorghum,249 a 1988 film which won a Golden Bear award at the
Berlin Film Festival. This story about a young rural bride
forced to deal with brutality and resistance during Japan's
occupation of China includes the generally favored content
elements favored by the authorities: a setting in the past, an
external enemy, and a nationalistic sacrifice. Popular for both
its storyline and its style, Red Sorghum was the first Fifth
Generation film to find a mass audience. Nonetheless, Red
247. Id. at 347.
248. See id., (citing interview with John Thomson, Cultural Officer in
American Embassy in Beijing 1979-1981, Mar. 30, 1983). The U.S. was equally
disappointed at how China handled the films sent over by the U.S. See id.
249. RED SORGHUM (KMan Film Studio 1987).
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Sorghum's popularity was considered incidental by the critics
who still viewed it as an art film.
250
1. Intemationalfilm festivals
China's participation in film festivals dates back as early
as the 1950s, when it sent some feature-length films to
represent China in international film festivals in other
communist countries such as Yugoslavia and Poland.51 In
more recent years, China began to view international prizes as
another way to revitalize its film industry.
The pressure to win international prizes intensified; with
the domestic film market in a slump and foreign distribution
growing more important, such prizes provided not only sorely
needed critical recognition but also a seal of commercial
viability.
252
China recognizes the dual benefits that derive from
hosting international film festivals. Not only do they promote
good relations with other countries through exchange of
culture, but they also promote development in China's
domestic film industry. China hosts three major film festivals
each year: the Shanghai Film Festival, the Changchun Film
Festival, and the Zhujiang Film Festival. 3
The Changchun Film Festival is held in the capital of
northeast China's Jilin Province. Sponsored by the Ministry of
Radio, Film and Television, the six-day festival has been held
every two years since 1992.4 In addition to China, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and twenty-two other countries submitted films
to the 1996 competition. 25 5 Despite ample non-Chinese
250. See Zha, supra note 9, at 144.
251. See Chinese Prize-winning films at international festivals (1949 - 1982),
1982/83 CHINA OFFICIAL ANNUAL REPORT (Hong Kong, Kingsway, 1983), at 708-
710, cited in Hancock, supra note 5, at 338.
252. Zha, supra note 9, at 145.
253. See Changchun to Hold Third Film Festival, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE,
1996 WL 10824035 (June 28, 1996).
254. Changchun is known as the "film city" of China because it is the home of
China's first film studio. See Changchun to Hold Fourth Film Festival, XINHUA
ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, 1998 WL 12153662 (May 6, 1998).
255. See Wang Chen, The Third Changchun Film Festival, BEJING REv., Oct.
14-20, 1996, at 33.
[Vol. 21:239
19991 CENSORSHIP IN CHINESE CINEMA 289
participation, the festival granted no award for Best Foreign
Language Film. 2 6 Perhaps this failure to recognize the merit of
films which did not even compete in the same language
category as Chinese films is a symptom of China's current
nationalistic attitudes. The biennial Shanghai Film Festival
was established in 1995, and is the only PRC festival listed as
one of the world's nine leading film festivals by the
International Federation of Film Producers' Association.
25 7
China's behavior regarding film festivals held elsewhere,
however, has been less than exemplary. When things don't go
its way, China's reaction has been to gather its films and go
home. For example, China abruptly withdrew eleven films
from the 1994 Hong Kong Film Festival after the programmers
refused China's request that three films not be shown: Wang
Xiaoshuai's The Days, He Yi's Red Beads, and Clara Law's
Temptations of a Monk.258 And in 1997 China pulled the
mainstream China-backed film King of Masks from the Hong
Kong International Film Festival after protesting to no avail
the inclusion of underground mainland works in the
Festival.5 9
With regard to the seven young directors banned in one
sweep, one Chinese film critic wondered:
Why, if they claim to support the film industry, are they
banning the work of seven of the country's best young
directors? It simply doesn't make sense. The real reason is
obvious. They don't like the movies or the movie makers,
and this business with the Rotterdam Film Festival is just
an excuse to crack down on them.6
Participation or lack thereof in film festivals may thus be a
ruse for China when it feels that it cannot control its
filmmakers by other means.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. See Godfrey Cheshire, supra note 55, at 65. Clara Law is a Hong Kong
director, so China was trying to extend its suppressive reach beyond its own
filmmakers.
259. Owners Expected to Turn Screw, Anxious Not to Upset Beying, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING PoST, Apr. 21, 1997, at 3.
260. Crothell, supra note 198.
In her 1985 article, Marguerite Gong Hancock noted that
"[tihe cancellation of a film event, although seemingly trivial
from an American point of view, is regarded by the Chinese as
a carefully considered response to a serious political
problem."26' This comment was made before the Chinese
government began to ban Chinese films and filmmakers from
film events seemingly out of hand. Thus it seems that in the
13 years that have passed, the Chinese authorities are now
acting not out of consideration of a "serious political problem,"
but rather out of habit or reflex.
Just as China is eager boost its status as a world player
by acting as host for a wide variety of international
conferences and events,262 China also has tried to make itself
an international film presence by hosting film festivals and
other cinema-related events. For example, in October of 1996,
Beijing hosted the Symposium on Film Collections in Asia.
Proudly, if inaccurately, touted in China's official press as "the
first ever international film symposium for the world's film
industry," the event was actually initiated and organized by
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization [UNESCO].263
More than 80 film and cultural experts from 20 countries and regions,
including Japan, Thailand, Sri Lanka, the United States, France, China
and Hong Kong, as well as UNESCO representatives, participated in the
symposium. Experts discussed the film history of Asia, the archival
heritage of films, the characteristics of China's early films, and the
development process of China's film industry.264
Stretching the significance of this event almost to
absurdity by linking it to other events China has hosted,
China's Vice-Minister of Film, Radio and Television
commented, 'The fact that China hosted both the film
symposium and the 13th International Conference on Archives
indicates that the international community and the Chinese
261. See Hancock, supra note 5, at 329.
262. The events China has jockeyed to host range from the 1995 International
Women's Conference, to its failed bid for the 2000 Olympics. J.T. Nguyen, U.P.I.,
Aug. 17, 1995.
263. Wang Chen, Beying Hosts Film Collections Symposium, BEIJING REV., Nov.
4-10, 1996, at 40.
264. Id.
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government attach great importance to archives."265 His
remark displays yet another opportunity to highlight China's
status as an international player.
2. The Importation and Censorship of Non-Chinese Films
The generally archaic ways of China's film bureaucracy
has stunned and confused visitors from foreign film
industries. China has attempted to counter these reactions
with reassuring words, such as those of Wu Mengchen:
"China's film industry is in a time of transition. One of the
main characteristics is that it is changing from a welfare-state
mode to a moneymaking mode."
266
In 1995, China made groundbreaking deals to import
foreign films. Replacing the previous low, flat rate for second-
run Hollywood pictures, Chinese authorities allowed ten
recent blockbusters to be released in China. The studios that
made the movies were to receive a share of box office
receipts.26 Among the movies imported under this new system
were The Lion King,266 The Fugitive,269 and True Lies. 2 0 Theater
attendance jumped back up, giving hope to Hollywood studios
for further collaboration and profit. Eager executives from
almost every major Hollywood studio, lured by China's
potentially huge movie market and eager to position
themselves for future deals, flocked to China's Shanghai Film
Festival in October 1995, where an official announced that the
state-run monopoly on film distribution would be broken in
1996, allowing individual studios and producers to distribute
American movies for the first time.27 '
265. Wang Chen, Beiing Hosts Film Collections Symposium, BEIJING REV., Nov.
4-10, 1996, at 40 (quoting Zhao Shi, Vice Minister of Radio, Film and Television).
266. Zha, supra note 9, at 149.
267. Id.
268. THE LION KING (Disney 1994).
269. THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. 1993)
270. Among the U.S. films that have been excluded "on political grounds" are
the James Bond film, GOLDENEYE (United Artists 1995), as well as the
unabashedly pro-U.S.A. APOLLO 13 (Universal Pictures 1995). James Harding,
Multiplex cinemas plan for China, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 11, 1997, at 4, available
in LEXIS, News & Analysis File.
271. Seth Faison, A Chinese Wall Shows Cracks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at
Dl.
Hollywood's dreams of huge Chinese audiences,
American-style theater complexes, and movie-related theme
parks may yet come true, but Hollywood's entrepreneurs must
still contend with China's shifting cultural policy and wrestle
with Chinese film bureaucrats who are likely to fight to
preserve control over their fiefdoms. "It should not take long
for Hollywood executives to figure out what many foreign
investors learned in the 1980s: China may be a gold mine, but
it is also a minefield. 272
In 1994, Beijing's film distributor, the China Film Import
& Export Corporation [Chinafilm, 273 promised to import the
ten most popular foreign films each year.274 This promise,
however, was subordinate to the less trumpeted but more
consequential conditions that the numbers of imported films
would still be influenced by Chinafilm's capacity and market
fluctuations, and that "China will keep the examination of
foreign films to make sure their contents are in line with the
Chinese situation and laws."27 Thus, importing the ten most
popular films really refers to the films China can afford to
import, and that survive strict censorship. Audience demand
had almost nothing to do with it. China viewed film imports as
healthy competition and thus stimulation for its domestic film
industry.276 The promise, then, rang somewhat hollow in light
of these underlying provisions and motivations, indicating that
the authorities were simply telling both U.S. film distributors
and Chinese filmgoers what they wanted to hear. Despite the
crossed-fingers-behind-the-back disclaimers of the Chinese
government, in 1996 the Chinese government allowed eleven
U.S. movies to be shown in theaters, and also increased the
number of foreign films allowed to be shown at international
film festivals.
277
272. Zha, supra note 9, at 149.
273. Chinafilm was a monopoly until 1996. Atkinson, supra note 69, at 38.
274. See China Lifts Film Import Quota, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 19, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 7711741.
275. Id. Wang Zengfu, Deputy General Manager of Chinafilm, commenting on
the 1995 renewal of the 1994 promise to import the ten most popular films each
year.
276. See Lii, supra note 39, at 13.
277. See Atkinson, supra note 69, at 39.
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This ten-imports-per-year quota was eliminated at the
June 1996 intellectual property rights talks between China
and the United States. In addition, China ended Chinaffilm's
monopoly over distribution, by beginning to allow Chinese film
studios to sign cooperative agreements with U.S. film
producers to distribute foreign films. The government
conferred this privilege on those studios deemed to produce
"higher quality" [read, "politically correct"] films.278 Chinese
studios jumped at this opportunity. That year, the Changchun
Film Studio won the rights to distribute Waterworld 9 and the
Shanghai Film Studio signed a deal to distribute Toy Story.20
Movies such as The Piano,28' Schindler's List, 2 2 Forrest
Gump,28  and True Lies earned high revenues at Chinese box
offices.284
However, China soon backpedaled on these newly agreed-
to policies. That July, China's Central Propaganda Department
issued an order demanding self-criticism, "from a political
point of view," of the just-consummated policy of importing
large quantities of U.S. movies. The Ministry of Radio, Film
and Television decided to cancel the implementation of the
plan to import ten foreign films per year. Airtime for imported
programs was cut in half, from thirty to fifteen percent. A large
influx of American movies, according to Ding Guang'en, head
of the Central Propaganda Department, was extremely
harmful to China's culture and traditional values.285 China's
importation of U.S. films has thus been threatened by
President Jiang's campaign against "cultural infiltration.
8 6
278. See He Bian, Why Prohibit the Importation of Foreign Movies?, CHINA
Focus, Aug. 1, 1996 available in 1996 WL 11751443. See also Atkinson, supra
note 69, at 39.
279. WATERWORLD (MCA 1995).
280. See Atkinson, supra note 69, at 39.
281. THE PIANO (Spectrum Films 1993)
282. SCHINDLER'S LIST (Universal 1993).
283. FORREST GUMP (Paramount 1994).
284. See He Bian, supra note 278.
285. See id.
286. This campaign to "build traditional [Chinese] values" has been criticized
as ineffective.
[Clorrupt officials like Wang Saosen (Vice Mayor of Beijing, who
committed suicide when his debauched lifestyle and embezzlement of
1999]
Underlying this ideological tightening, bitter disputes
between China and the U.S. about market access and
intellectual property protection have threatened the bilateral
film exchanges. That U.S. films are now screened in China at
all these days is the result of recent understandings between
the two nations.
When blocking foreign films' entry into China, often
officials attempt to frame their objections in ways to make
China seem victimized. In January, Director General of the
Ministry of Radio, Film and Television, Ma Yuanhe, denounced
the Hollywood film Seven Years in Tibet as being among those
films that "attack China viciously" and "hurt the feelings of the
Chinese people.2 87 His edict called upon China to "maintain
sharp vigilance" against such films. 288 Ma admitted that he
had not even seen the film, but was speaking out on the basis
of rumors. 289 A more savvy reaction to these U.S. films about
Tibet has been the release of at least one Chinese film that
purports to tell the Chinese side of the story. Shanghai Film
Studios, for example, produced Feng Xiaoning's jingoistic
1997 film Red River Valley [Hong He Gu].290 Describing an
abortive British invasion of Tibet in the early 1904, the film
attempts to counter what it considers Western anti-Beijing
propaganda. 291 Despite generous publicity and government
funds were about to be exposed) are everywhere. The Propaganda
Department demanded resistance of "bad influences from abroad," but
in fact bad influences within China (violent crime, corruption, bribery,
tax evasion, smuggling, prostitution, and pornography) are everywhere,
and they alone are sufflient to jeopardize the preservation of "traditional
values." Why look "abroad" to find sources of bad influence?
He Bian, supra note 278.
287. H.K. Free to Show Anti - China Films, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 12,
1998.
288. Maggie Farley, Company Town; Hong Kong Bows to Beiing in Turning
Away 3 U.S. Films, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at D1.
289. See supra note 287. "I have not time to see it," Ma stated, "but I have
heard a lot." Id.
290. RED RIVER VALLEY (Shanghai Film Studios 1997).
291. Producer Zhang Jianmin proudly declared that the studio made 8 million
yuan in China and another 7 million from Korea and Japan, from their 14 billion
yuan ($1.7 million) investment in the film. Quoted in Havis, supra note 176, at
38-39.
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backing, the film won no prizes at the third annual Shanghai
Film Festival.292
In 1996, foreign films accounted for roughly 40 percent of
all Chinese movie ticket sales.293 The U.S. films China has
agreed to import are illustrative of its censorship policies and
emphasis. For instance, in the summer of 1996, film
distributors in China strenuously promoted Waterworld.294
Proud that the Chinese market had somehow "attracted" the
most lavish, expensive film ever made, Chinese authorities
also supported the messages contained in the film.2 95 Xinhua
described the underwater world depicted in the film as one in
which "men and women have to struggle for survival, often
against evil forces."296 Struggles for survival sit well with
China's proclaimed human rights policy, which is that citizens
have a right to subsistence first, with political and speech
rights more incidental. In this way, the theme of Waterworld
could be safely used by the CCP as a metaphor for the
communist revolution, as long as no one construed the
flooded city as "drowned" ideas. Thus being a close-enough
parable for the communist revolution, the movie was deemed
fit for Chinese audiences.
Another telling import was Bridges of Madison County,
shown in China in the spring of 1996.297 The title itself is ideal
for the diplomatic exchange the film deal represented, as the
title contains an attractive metaphor of bridging, such as
between China and the United States, where the fdm was
made. Besides the title, the movie's, theme exemplifies safe
entertainment in the eyes of the Chinese authorities. The
film's "heroine" is a rural housewife in a loveless marriage. Her
decision to fulfill her family responsibilities instead of running
off with her itinerant lover helped the film secure a stamp of
292. See Farley, supra note 288, at Dl.
293. See Atkinson, supra note 69, at 39. That market share did not increase
from 1995, when the nine lone imported films released in Beijing brought in the
same percentage (40%) of Beijing's box office revenues of $11.4 million. See id.
294. See Waterworld to be shown in Chinese theaters, XINHUA ENGLISH
NEWSwIRE, Aug. 19, 1996 available in 1996 WL 11051742.
295. See id.
296. Id.
297. BRIDGES OF MADISON COUNTY (Warner Bros 1995).
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approval from China's film censors, as well as positive reviews
from the semi-official Chinese press.298 Both the censors and
the film reviewers recognized the entertainment value of the
film. According to film critic Liang Xiaosheng,
Bridges of Madison County tells a love story that not only
caters to modem people's contemporary sexual ideas, but
also gives consideration to modem people's attachment to
traditional family values.... I think that Bridges is like a
meteorological balloon that has floated to the skies above
China and through it we can measure our social climate.299
However, such a film does not measure China's social
climate so much as maintain it. Chinese audiences, many of
whom are themselves in loveless marriages," may feel
comforted watching their own dilemma played out on screen,
especially by rich Hollywood stars, no less. One Chinese man
who had seen the film remarked, "Chinese people can relate to
the movie because seven out of ten Chinese marriages are
loveless. People here got married for other reasons." 0'° Rather
than inspire social change, such a film bolsters the status quo
by making people content with their own situations.
Iv
Film Production and the Censorship Process in
Contemporary China
This section describes the realities of film production and
censorship in contemporary China. It begins by describing the
financial options for producing a film in China, and goes on to
detail the process by which a film is created and censored.
Particular attention is given to the actions and rationales of
the censors, who not only control release of finished
productions, but also initial script approval and exportation.
298. See Steve Mufson, 'Madison County' Bridges Two Cultures, WASHINGTON
POST, Apr. 27, 1996, at C1.
299. Id.
300. A 1996 poll suggested that nearly 40% of Chinese said that love was not
the basis for marriage. See Mufson, supra note 298.
301. Id.
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A. Five Methods of Film Production
1. State-studio films
In terms of complex, far-reaching control systems
designed to micro-manage style and content, China's official,
state-sanctioned (but now financially independent) film
studios like the Shanghai or Beijing Film Studios arguably
resemble closely controlled big film studios in the West. Just
as Chinese commercial law favors the big economic players
over the little guys-in contrast to the U.S. notion that
commercial law should level the playing field-the same is
true of Chinese film law. Accordingly, the bigger studios and
the films they produce receive the most favorable treatment by
the Chinese authorities.
2. Co-productions
The second option for producing movies is through big co-
productions, known as "associated productions," between the
studios and foreign companies. Generally these are not co-
productions in a strict sense, because the Chinese side does
not usually contribute any money of its own. Foreign
companies need to partake in a joint venture to make a film in
China, so an associated production gives the foreign company
a local partner. While the foreign company benefits by gaining
access to China's film market, the Chinese studio essentially
hires out its crew, equipment, and services to the foreign
company.
When the time was ripe for China's film industry- like
many other Chinese industries- to look outside for financial
sustenance, many top mainland filmmakers turned to co-
productions with foreign investors who would cover most of
the budget and assume control of production and distribution
outside China. As a result, China could no longer shoot films
for its domestic market alone; for its movie industry to remain
viable, it had to place more emphasis on foreign distribution.
This prioritization, however, has grown to overshadow China's
domestic market. Many of the big Fifth Generation films like
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Raise the Red Lantern30 2 have been made through joint
ventures 303
Another example of such a co-production is The Sisters
304Three, a true story about three Chinese women who were
born into a privileged Shanghai household at the turn of the
century and who ended up playing significant roles in China's
1949 communist revolution. 30 5 The $9 million epic was
produced by Hong Kong's Golden Harvest movie company, and
financed by a joint fund set up by three companies: Hong
Kong's Golden Harvest Studio, Hong Kong's Citicorp Asia, and
the Television Corporation of Singapore.3 0 6 Golden Harvest set
up the joint fund for this picture in order to be able to film in
China. Not only did the filmmakers obtain permission to shoot
there, but China provided 2,000 People's Liberation Army
personnel to work as extras in the film. 7
For a while, co-productions were a buyer's market for
foreign companies because China was desperate for the
money.30 8 China felt torn, however, between the need for
foreign investment and the desire for independent
development.3 9 Zhu Yongde, president of the Shanghai Film
Studio has remarked, "[floreign help and co-productions are
important but every country should rely on its own talents to
develop the film industry., 31 0 Increasingly suspicious of foreign
involvement, Chinese authorities have allowed only about 20
to 30 co-productions with overseas partners per year,3" ' and
foreign investors have in turn become increasingly nervous
302. RAISE THE RED LANTERN (century Communications 1991).
303. Judy Stone, "Will he or won't he? Chinese director of Ju Dou not expected
to attend Oscars," S.F. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1991 at C3. RAISE THE RED LANTERN is a
Taiwan-China co-production. Id.
304. THE SISTERS THREE (Golden Harvest 1997).
305. See Sandi Tan, The Sisters Three-The Soong Women in $9m epic film:
"About the three sisters" and "18 minutes cut by Chinese censors," SINGAPORE
STRAITS TIMES, May 7, 1997.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See Shanghai-based independent film producer Megan Gathercole,
quoted in Lee, supra note 86.
309. See id. (Lee, supra note 86.)
310. Id.
311. See Lili, supra note 39, at 17.
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about increased political meddling. As a result, associated
productions have slacked off, and Chinese filmmakers have
increasingly looked to domestic investors to back their films.312
Red Cherry and Warrior Lanling313 are two examples of Chinese
films sponsored exclusively by domestic companies. 14
3. Changbiao
In a changbiao production, a private company effectively
buys an official studio's right to make a film.315 The private
company goes ahead and makes the film, then stamps an
official studio name on it to gain legitimacy. 36 In exchange for
lending out its official stamp, the studio gets some much-
needed free cash. 7 Changbiao films are often substantially
different from studio films. In Expectation,"' a 1996 film made
by a private company and the Beijing Film Studio,
demonstrates how a film that would normally encounter
roadblocks as a studio film can get made and released
because of its changbiao status. Despite its politically sensitive
setting in a small town that will be flooded out by the
controversial Three Gorges Dam, and despite its examination
of a customarily sensitive topic, a possible rape offense, In
Expectation managed to get past the censors. Since authorities
tend to look favorably upon films that depict civil employees as
diligent and upstanding, the film's positive portrayal of a local
police investigator probably helped in its release.
4. Hong Kong-funded films
Hong Kong companies fund Chinese films on the
mainland. In the past, these films were often featured at film
festivals, such as Media Asia's Swordsman Tale,319 Sun
312. See id.
313. WARRIOR LANGLING (Shanghai Film Studios 1995).




318. IN EXPECTATION (Bejing Film Studio 1996).
319. SWORDSMAN TALE (Media Asia).
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Valley, 32 or Ocean Films' historical epic, The Emperor's
Shadow.3 21 However, the practice of Hong-Kong funding has
tailed off in recent years, due to the new restrictions and the
fact that few foreign corporations are currently interested in
buying the finished products.322
This aversion may soon change, however, because of the
way China's film regulations treat Hong Kong movies. Even
fully Hong Kong-made movies- famous traditionally for kung
fu and action, not social commentary- are not exempt from
China's censorship. A full decade before Hong Kong would
revert to Chinese rule, Hong Kong already anticipated the
more restrictive censorship atmosphere, and embarked upon
self-censorship to ingratiate itself with the mainland
government. 23 At first, such censorship was unofficial, without
legal foundation.
In March of 1987, the Asian Wall Street Journal reported
that Hong Kong's government had banned films for political
reasons, without legal authority. 324 The following month, the
government gave itself that lacking legal authority by
introducing a bill that would in turn give its censors the right
to ban films which might damage ties with China. 25 One of the
bill's sponsors elaborated that the bill would give censors legal
authority to ban films "seriously prejudicial to good relations
with territories outside Hong Kong."326 Thus, the government
seemingly conceded to the accusations of banning films out of
political motivations without legal authority- not by
eliminating politics from the equation, but rather by simply
declaring it legal to leave them in.
320. SUN VALLEY (Media Asia).
321. THE EMPEROR'S SHADOW (Ocean Films 1996).
322. See Higgins, supra note 114.
323. See Hong Kong Introduces New Law to Censor Anti-China Films, REUTERS,
Apr. 3, 1987; available in LEXIS, International News File.
324. The article quoted a Hong Kong senior government official as saying
legislation was necessary to prevent import of Taiwanese propaganda films aimed
at creating tension between Hong Kong and China. Between 1974 and 1987,
Hong Kong had twenty films for political reasons. Most of those films were made
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Nonetheless, Hong Kong's Broadcasting, Culture, and
Sport Deputy Secretary, Rita Lau-ng Wai Lan, denied that
censorship has tightened in Hong Kong since the handover.32 r
According to her, films remain subject to the usual censorship
requirements, but the process does not involve political
328judgments about the movies. Despite such reassurances,
however, self-censorship rose in Hong Kong not only since the
handover, but also leading up to it. For example, award-
winning Hong Kong director Wang Kar-wai deliberately
completed his film Happy Togethe?29 before the handover,
which is about a gay relationship. "We agreed that if we
wanted to do something like this, we should do it now," Wang
explained in early 1997.3° Another Hong Kong filmmaker,
Clara Law (A Floating Life 31) put the same sentiments more
bluntly: "In terms of censorship, it's obvious what's going to
happen. I don't think the future looks very bright."
332
In January of 1998, Beijing tried to allay fears and
allegations of centrally-imposed censorship in Hong Kong by
pledging not to block anti-China films from being shown in
Hong Kong.333 One Chinese official stated that a Hong Kong
film distributor's purchase of the rights to screen Seven Years
in Tibet,334 a move expected to test freedom of expression in
post-handover Hong Kong, was not an issue for Beijing.335
Notably, this statement was made by the same official, Ma
Yuanhe, who had denounced the same film as "hurting the
feelings of the Chinese people."
36
Testing the bounds of permissibility is not the typical
response by Hong Kong's film industry. Rather, many film
executives opt for an ample margin of safety between their
327. See Hong Kong Free to Show Anti-China Films, supra note 287.
328. See id
329. HAPPY TOGETHER (Block 2 Pictures 1997).
330. Quoted in Richard James Havis, New Script Needed: Hong Kong movies
are in a reelfix, ASIAWEEK, Dec. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13178260.
331. A FLOATING LIFE (Southern Star 1996).
332. Id.
333. See Hong Kong Free to Show Anti-China Films, supra note 287.
334. SEVEN YEARS IN TIBET (Columbia/TriStar 1997).
335. See Hong Kong Free to Show Anti-China Films, supra note 287.
336. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
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decisions and the government strictures. Self-censorship,
thus, dominates the Hong Kong film as well as other media
industries. For example, Tony Wong of Hong Kong's
Cinemation Films International has said that he will not buy
very politically sensitive films: 'There are a lot of good
movies- why buy one that might cause trouble?"337 Although
he admitted wanting to see films such as Kundun and Seven
Years in Tibet, Wong said that because distribution rights are
usually sold in a package, he would instead wait for the
pirated disks.338
Even after Hong Kong has officially become part of China,
Hong Kong movies still count as "foreign" for purposes of
China's limit of ten imported films per year.339 This
categorization will probably encourage more Hong Kong
producers to make their films in China if that market is a
target for their film.
5. Independent films
"While film and political theorists continue to ponder the
subtext of films emerging from China and Hong Kong,"
another response to censorship has been simply to make films
without permission. 4 ° Just as there is a distinction between
established and non-established media in China, so is there a
distinction between official and independent or underground
film in China. 341 However, the distinction between official and
independent or underground media is often more sharp in
cinema than in other media, because of the capital-intensive
nature of filmmaking.34 2 As a result, some films, particularly
the "new documentaries," get made outside of the official
337. Interviewed in Farley, supra note 288. Although the interviewer notes
that Wong made this latter comment "with a laugh," it is likely true that such
politically sensitive films will Indeed get seen in Hong Kong, just not through
official channels. Id.
338. See id.
339. See Bruce Einhorn, What Hit Hong Kong's Film Industry?, BUSINESSWEEK,
May 4, 1998, at 34. '
340. Lehrer, supra note 173, at 15.
341. For general details about the media aspect of this point, see Fu & Cullen,
supra note 28, at 17.
342. See id.
[Vol. 21:239Hastings Comm/Ent LTJ
financing structure altogether. 43 Although some of these
documentary filmmakers are film school graduates who were
denied jobs due to their participation in the 1989 Tiananmen
events, their films are not meant as anti-government agit prop,
and do not focus on countering repression. Nonetheless, these
essentially illegal films are frowned upon by the authorities.
Like all films in China, they are still subject to regulation, but
as tinderground fims they are actually "regulated" by a
combination of the new free market forces operating in the
economy and government administrative systems for
controlling media and culture. 44
Independent productions gradually became common
practice in China in the 1990s, particularly among the
younger Sixth Generation filmmakers such as Zhang Yuan,
Wu Wenguang, and Wang Xiaoshuai.345 "Although often
obliged to carry a state studio's insignia, these films were
independent projects shot with privately raised funds and by
privately organized crews."346 If a completed movie failed to
pass the official censors, it would be blocked from domestic
release; showings within China would be limited to small
discreet groups in apartments or dorm rooms.34 However,
copies of the film often turned up in foreign film festivals,
where Chinese films frequently won awards. 38 Later the films
are sometimes released domestically, after Chinese audiences
have had an opportunity to hear the international hoopla.
Plus, having garnered some international attention, the
343. See Lehrer, supra note 173.
344. See Einhorn, supra note 339, at 47.
345. Zha, supra note 9, at 147. Xie Jin, the established Third Generation
director, has criticized the Sixth Generation for bucking the system. "Some
young directors send films out of China without first receiving permission for
public showing from the film bureau. This is illegal. According to regulations,
filmmakers who break these laws will be criticised, fined, and their productions
confiscated." Xie Jin Speaks Out, (visited Mar. 26, 1998)
<http://fllmfestivals.com/mtrea197/mnew21 .htm>.
346. Id.
347. For example, when Zhang Yuan wanted to show his film East Palace,
West Palace, the director had to invite his friends to his tiny Beijing apartment
where he showed his film on the video machine. See Chinese Cinema from
Beiing, supra note 173; see also Havis, supra note 176.
348. See Zha, supra note 9, at 147.
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filmmakers can often raise more private funds or receive film
grants from abroad for their next projects.3 49 "Shot on a small
budget and often with extremely limited distribution, these
works have been uneven. Perhaps reflecting certain fixations
of the filmmakers' common age and background, these films
almost all deal with themes of contemporary urban
alienation."
311
This unofficial, outlying "category" has allowed room for
the fresh and essentially illegal "new documentaries" to
proliferate. Without much funding from any source, these
filmmakers make do without studios, often simply using
hand-held video cameras out in the street or in private
apartments. 5'
B. Film Production and the Censorship Process
According to a Chinese political maxim, "to control a
matter, one first must control the personnel involved."352
Accordingly, the Chinese government controls filmmaking by
making sure government officials are involved in film
production, from early stages. At the official studios, of course,
such government presence is expected. But government
representation makes its way into most film production in
China, including joint projects with foreign co-producers. The
following discussion of the steps involved in producing a film,
from script approval, film processing, approval upon
completion, to taking the film out of China, illustrate the
points along the process where the government throws up
obstacles, how some films have succeeded or failed at
deflecting them, and what factors seem important in decisions
to approve, interfere with, or ban films.
1. Script approval
The Chinese treat script approval in much the same way
they treat contracts. Contracts in China function more as
official recognition of a relationship, rather than binding
349. See id.
350. Id.
351. See Lehrer, supra note 173.
352. Fu & Cullen, supra note 28, at 37.
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agreements about obligations.353 Similarly, script approval
does not grant conclusive approval of a project, but rather
marks the starting point of the censorship process. A director
submits a script to the Film Bureau as a proffer of what the
film will include, and the Bureau's agreement that the script
meets government standards allows the filmmaker to take the
project to the next stage. After that, the censorship continues
to function as a process of negotiations.5 4 Script approval,
then, is not a thumbs-up or thumbs-down on the project as a
whole, but rather grants narrow permission to the filmmaker
to continue navigating the system.
Film officials might, for example, approve a script but
condition production on a director's promise to work on a
separate project as well. Thus, just as a contract does not, in
the Chinese view, bind the parties under all foreseeable
circumstances,5 5 script approval does not guarantee a project
can go forward without subsequent governmental
requirements and interference. Should the authorities
determine at some point that the filmmakers' interests have
diverged with the government's, the authorities are unlikely to
simply pull the plug on a film, but will instead stall until a
new agreement can be reached as to the form the film should
take. In this way, approval of a film script does not constitute
endorsement of the project, but rather a green light to keep
working for the time being.56
Disapproval of a film script does not necessarily halt the
project. If a film is to be made by an official studio, the writer
of the rejected script may be replaced by a different writer.
Reworking the script within the theme and parameters set
forth by the studio sometimes requires even a third writer
until the Film Bureau is satisfied with the script.5 7 Under
353. Professor James V. Feinerman, Lecture given to Chinese Law Seminar at
Georgetown University Law Center (Feb. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Feinerman
Lecture].
354. Jenny Kwok Wah Lau has argued that symbolic productions such as film
can be viewed as a site of negotiation for different cultural traditions. See Lau,
supra note 229, at 16.
355. See Feinerman Lecuture, supra note 353.
356. Feinerman, supra note 124.
357. See Havis, supra note 330.
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these conditions, writers learn to work within the official
system if they ever want to see scripts they wrote produced.
By the same token, sometimes directors are yanked from
projects, too. For example, in the fall of 1993, after shooting
only a few scenes of Chicken Feathers,35 8 Zhang Yuan was
abruptly removed from the project." 9 Zhang was replaced, and
the shooting went on without him. Chicken Feathers was not
even financed by the Chinese government-it was to be
Zhang's third privately-financed feature film. 3 ° Although no
reason was given for the order to discharge Zhang, word had it
that his film Beiing Bastards had sufficiently irked the
authorities with its portrayals of hooliganism that they wanted
to punish him.36 ' These changes in personnel demonstrates
that the censors had a problem not with Chicken Feathers'
content, but rather with the person involved.
China's authorities have not declared objective criteria for
scripts; rather they decide on a case-by-case basis. A ruling on
one film may have no consequence for a similar film,
depending on a myriad of other factors, like timing, persons
involved and the current international climate. However, the
two most significant factors considered by censors are content
and style.
a. Content
Despite a lack of articulated guidelines as to what content
is favored in Chinese films, throughout China's post-liberation
film history, the films that have successfully passed the
censors to enjoy distribution in China generally contain
certain elements: positive acknowledgment of the Communist
Party, protection of national dignity, and adherence to socialist
agendas.
As early as 1954, the CCP issued an official statement to
filmmakers stating the messages that films were allowed to
impart. The People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), which remains the
358. CHICKEN FEATHERS (1993).
359. Godfrey Cheshire, Chinese Checkers, Filmmakers Banned by Chinese
Authorities, 30 FILM COMMENT 65, (1994).
360. See id.
361. See id.
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approved newspaper of the CCP, summarized film's dual
function in post-liberation China in these colorful words:
[Feature films] must reflect from all aspects the excitement
and liveliness of our motherland, the true contradiction in
life, and growing new forces in it, and must deal merciless
blows to those dying things that obstruct our progress.3 62
This official statement, designed to make film guidelines
clear, nevertheless contains some serious contradictions.
"Excitement and liveliness" indicates that films should have a
positive, upbeat tone. Today's authorities seem to hold
Chinese films to this standard, if only when useful to do so.
Perhaps the notion that films must not present "the ugly side"
of culture derives from this official statement. On the other
hand, the words that follow in the statement instruct films to
reflect "the true contradiction in life," which seemingly allows
a depiction of conflict, even discord, among unspecified forces.
While the CCP could not have been referring to contradictions
between, say, that individual and society, nor socialist ideals
and the realities of survival, the term "contradiction" does
seem to recognize that certain negative ideas should receive
treatment.
This official statement can be compared with the CCP's
1956 Hundred Flowers slogan. 36 3 It is significant that Mao's
speech had referred to style, not content. China's 1990s
leadership has adhered to this by arbitrary, non-transparent
censorship, rather than declaring a particular style to be
banned.
362. Hancock, supra note 5, at 337 (quoting RENMIN RIBAO, Jan. 17, 1954).
363. The Hundred Flowers phrase derives from the following quote:
Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought
contend is the policy for promoting the progress of the arts and the
sciences and a flourishing socialist culture in our land. Different forms
and styles should develop freely and different schools in science should
contend freely. We think that it is harmful to the growth of art and
science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular
style of art or school of thought and to ban another. Questions of right
and wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free
discussion in artistic and scientific circles and through practical work in
these fields. They should not be settled in summary fashion.
Mao Zedong, On The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (Feb.
27, 1957), in 5 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 408 (Foreign Languages
Press, 1977).
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Perhaps then, one could argue that today's leadership in
China has taken content standards even further toward the
unattained extreme than Mao's leadership. The films made in
compliance with the 1954 guidelines may illustrate the proper
interpretation of the guidelines. For example, the studios
made "features and documentaries on such topics as land
reform and liberation, lauding the work of the Communists in
overturning corruptions of the old order."364 Herein may lie the
seemingly different interpretations of the early guidelines.
Films could depict the old order in a negative light, but must
depict the contemporary order in a positive light, 365 or at least
in a way that does not constitute a backhanded criticism of
the current regime. 366 Just as Mao-era films had to show the
communist revolution in a positive light, now films must show
post-liberation China in a positive light.
As an example of suspected backhanded criticism, the
censors may have found Chen Kaige's depiction of 1920's
China disagreeable in his film Temptress Moon. Comparisons
have been drawn between China of the 1920s and China of
the 1990s.3 67 Although Chen has asserted that the opium
craze depicted in Temptress Moon is "just a symbol"
364. Hancock, supra note 5, at 337, 338.
365. This interpretation would be consistent with the Constitutional provision
that exercise of rights may not infringe upon the interest of the state. P.R.C.
CONST., art. 51 (1982).
366. The well-known Chinese opera, "The Peony Pavilion" was censored for
containing such backhanded criticism of the Manchus. When the Manchus
assumed power and established the Qing Dynasty (1644-191 1), they banned two
acts in the opera because they were interpreted as disrespectful of the Manchus.
The disrespect took an indirect form. The Peony Pavilion's story was set in the
Song Dynasty during the Mongol invasion. The play portrays the invading
Mongols as licentious, mutton-eating buffoons. It has been suggested that by
setting the opera during that period, author Tanz Xianzu was warning his Ming
government to beware the Manchus, who would overthrow the dynasty in less
than 50 years. Thus, to an audience of Tang's day, the derogatory portrayal of
the invaders would have implied criticism of the Manchus. To this day, the
music for seven arias remains missing. See ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 23,
1998, at 9.
367. For example, according to Chen Kaige, "China and Shanghai in the '20s
are very similar to China and Shanghai in the '90s." Gary Dretzka, Against the
Wall: Chinese films can't break through Chinese censorship, CHI. TRIB., June 22,
1997, Arts & Ent., §7, at 6.
[Vol. 21:239
CENSORSHIP IN CHINESE CINEMA
representing the poisons that erode cultural traditions,368 he
has also admitted that he does indeed use history "as a mirror
to reflect what's going on now... Shanghai is booming, just
as it was in the '20s, when there was corruption,
prostitution... (and) life was barbaric but full of vitality."369
Thus, one may infer that the censors probably deemed his film
a warning against the direction China's government is leading
the country.
Contemporary themes- especially pointed social
commentary, which have always been difficult to get made and
distributed- are frowned upon by the censors. One response
to this storyline censorship has been to mask political
messages in seemingly benign story lines,37 but often the
censors catch on to such gimmicks, though not necessarily at
the script approval stage.
Overt sexual themes are out as well.37 ' A number of films
have been censored or banned because of their sexually
explicit themes. For example, one of Best Actor Ge You's films,
Relations Between Man and Woman,372 got chopped by the
censors, due to what an official circular called the film's
"delight in showing ugliness."3 3 Although this film's title rather
bluntly suggests some sexual content, the tiUtles of other films
condemned by the circular suggest benign, if not bland
subject matter, such as How Steel is Made,374 directed by Tian
Zhuangzhuang, and Rice,375 directed by Huang Jianzhong. The
censors apparently dislike these films because they eschew
368. Guthmann, supra note 51, at 58.
369. Id.
370. Some flmmakers in other communist regimes made such subversion
into an art in itself. For example, in Eastern Europe filmmakers "developed
elaborate codes and extended parables to conceal subversive political messages."
Hence nice musicals and love stories were actually political statements. Bruni
Burres, director of the Human Rights Watch International Film Festival, quoted
in Lehrer, supra note 173, at 14.
371. See Havis, supra note 87.
372. RELATIONS BETWEEN MAN AND WOMAN.
373. Eddie Rivera, Asiamania: Asian Major Leaguers, TRANSPACIFIC, Mar. 1996
available in 1996 WL 136447755.
374. How STEEL IS MADE.
375. RICE.
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depiction of an "exemplary communist lifestyle" in favor of
rawer depictions of sexual promiscuity and drug addiction."'
Some sexually-themed films, however, do make it past the
censors. For example,, a strong undercurrent of eroticism runs
through the 1995 mystical drama Warrior Lanling. A "bloody
raw tale of magic in ancient China," the film contains
suggestions of incest, rape and murder.377 For this reason, it is
surprising that the film made it past the censors. Usually
trumpeted as a fully-fledged Shanghai Film Studios
Production, perhaps the fact that Warrior Lanling was financed
by a U.S. company (Vanke) and directed by an expatriate
Chinese (Hu Xuehua) facilitated its smooth sailing.378
A better-known example of the censors making allowances
for allusions to sex in film is Chen Kaige's 1993 film, Farewell
My Concubine,379 which strongly alludes to a gay relationship
between two young members of a Beijing Opera Troupe.8 °
Subjected to torturous training in their Beijing Opera troupe,
the two young performers grow into celebrated stage partners
onstage and intimate friends offstage. 381 Although the censors
held up the film's release until some "minor editing" had
376. An official film produced for the Beijing Film Studio, How Steel is Made
features a young worker who pursues a debauched life in a rock and roll band.
The film had to be cut several times before the censors would approve it. 'The
final version still makes some kind of sense, but there is a feeling that something
exceptional was destroyed." Nonetheless, drugs, booze and sex abound in the
movie. Audiences appreciate it, as one student remarked after a Shanghai
screening, "It was nice to see a film that was really about modem life, rather
than another historical epic." Havis, supra note 176.
377. Id.
378. See id.
379. Farewell My Concubine won the 1993 Palm d'Or at Cannes. See Erika
Milvy, Four New Collaborations, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 28, 1993, at 21.
380. Chen cleverly increased audience curiosity about his film by casting pop
music superstar Leslie Chang as one of the two young protagonists. For some
time, Chang's suspected homosexuality had titillated fans, so his participation in
Farewell My Concubine was a major selling point. See Lau, supra note 229, at 16.
Thus as a commercial product, Farewell My Concubine attracts audiences by
using Beijing opera to arouse nostalgia, and homosexuality to arouse curiosity.
See id.
381. See id.
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eliminated certain scenes, this film was not banned, 2 and the
final version leaves no question as to the boys' relationship.
One reason the homosexual content was tolerated by the
censors is historical. Because it is common knowledge that
homosexual practices did take place in opera troupes, the
film's treatment of homosexuality was considered acceptable
in its historical context, even though gays are not accepted in
mainstream Chinese society. Another reason is more strategic:
the authorities may have decided that good politics trumps
social taboo. The censors were willing to overlook the gay
content because the film's theme was consistent with the
current ideology. The film subtly endorsed the direction
China's government has led since the Cultural Revolution. The
three-hour melodrama spans China's precommunist era to the
Cultural Revolution, and depicts the torment directed at
intellectuals and artists by Party fanatics.
383
Whereas the Cultural Revolution had called for a life of
sacrifice in accord with a pure patriotic ideology, the Deng
administration sought pragmatically to reverse the national
non-productivity wrought by the Cultural Revolution. The
scene in Farewell My Concubine that reflects this
reprioritization features the actor who played the female
performing for the invading Japanese in order to save his
friend. Because Beijing Opera embodies Chinese nationalism,
performing for the enemy carries major implications of
national betrayal. In this way, the film emphasized the self-
interest of two individuals over national affairs, much as Deng
emphasized lifestyle improvement at the individual level over
concern for national politics. 384 Farewell My Concubine was
382. Guthmann, supra note 51, at 58.
383. In one scene, a crowd of interrogators screams, "Sweep away all cow
demons and snake spirits," as the film's leading man betrays his lover and
childhood friend. "Reveal the true face of the class enemiesl Uncover the black
gangs" FAREWELL MY CONCUBINE (Tomson Films 1993).
384. The film has been criticized on this point. Some claim that this scene not
only "trivializes one of the most horrific wars of resistance that the Chinese have
fought against invaders," but also distorts history because the actor upon which
that female role was based did refuse to perform for the Japanese, and even grew
a mustache to make his intentions clear. See Lau, supra note 229, at 16. In
addition, some within the Chinese intellectual community became critical and
suspicious of Chen and this film for joining the move toward the commercial
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screened for U.S. Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright when
she visited China this spring.385
The authorities are rumored also to be cracking down on
film violence. Three weeks after implementing censorship of
the Internet in September of 1996, China's authorities took
another swipe at the film industry as well, by warning the
public about unwholesome movies as well as television
programs.3
6
Other scripts particularly subject to scrutiny include any
movie about famous Chinese personalities.387 Such scripts are
not prohibited per se, of course, because the leadership
encourages films that celebrate certain good comrades.
However, the censors look closely at portrayals of well-known
figures, in order to ensure political correctness, if not
historical accuracy. Indeed, personalities that fit well with
current political priorities will be most favored by the censors.
For example, the 1997 changbiao movie Zhang Qian388
portrays a Chinese historical figure who played a key role in
the economic and cultural East-West interchange. Called the
"Chinese counterpart" to Marco Polo and Matteo Ricci,389
Zhang Qian is credited with having started the Silk Road
during the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 24). This film
about Zhang Qian probably received early and enthusiastic
approval because it reflects China's pride about an historical
figure who shaped early international commerce. Jiang's
administration has demonstrated hostility toward Western
mainstream. By then, however, such criticism sounded increasingly like isolated,
academic grumbling as almost all filmmakers took stock of the reality of the
bottom line and made various efforts to adjust and adapt. See Zha, supra note 9,
at 147.
385. Lewis Dolinsky, Notes From Here and There, S.F. CHRON, May 6, 1998, at
C2. Chen showed Albright around the Beijing Film Studio. When their
conversation turned to the U.S. blockbuster, Titanic, Albright reportedly said
twice that she thought it was a terrible movie, and Chen said he did not like it,
either. See id.
386. See Havis, supra note 87.
387. Censors and Sensibility: Cuts to Historical Film Wound Hong Kong
Director, WASH. POST. June 5, 1997, at C II.
388. ZHANG QIAN (1997)
389. Zhu Linyong, Film Hails Zhang's Brave Mission, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 26,
1998, available in 1998 WL 7594308.
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domination of both trade and culture, so celebrating a figure
such as Zhang Qian gives China an opportunity to reclaim it's
formative role in international trade.39 °
Notably, the film was adapted from an historical "novel,"39'
which indicates embellishment and fictionalization of
historical events and people. The censors apparently cared
less about a historically accurate portrayal of Zhang Qian,
than about the example of the ideal manufactured by the film,
as embodied by the director's description, which echoes party-
line praise of many other films: 'This film is a eulogy to the
noble spirit of ceaseless struggle for success despite
difficulties and obstacles."392 Even more illuminating is one
film critic's remark: "We do not know what Zhang was really
like, but we feel that he should be the type depicted in the
movie.,,
393
The censors took a somewhat similar approach to The
Sisters Three.94 Completed in 1995, the film was submitted for
censorship in China. Even though the film is Hong Kong-
made, all films shot in China must obtain a release permit
from China's censorship board. 3 ' After holding on to the film
for a whole year, the censors returned it- less eighteen
minutes of film. 396 Director Mabel Cheung complained that the
cuts were to major scenes, and therefore greatly harmed the
movie's overall balance.397
Eight minutes were cut out of a sequence in which
Chiang's wife, Meiling, makes a solo voyage to Xi'an to save
Chiang after his capture by communist warlords. 8 In this
390. A review of Zhang Qian in the China Daily takes the opportunity to list
the innovations China exported along the Silk Road: "silk cloth-making,
smelting, well-digging, and peach and pear tree-planting techniques, as well as
its four great inventions- printing, pepper-making, compass and gunpowder." Id&
"Zhang also introduced acupuncture and moxibustion to the Huns." Id.
391. The movie was adapted from "Envoy Who Created the Silk Ribbon of the
Earth" by Wang Xiangyu and Li Shengyi. See icL
392. Id. (quoting Wang Xingjun, director of Zhang Qian).
393. Id. (quoting Film critic Li Erwei).
394. THE SISTERS THREE.
395. See 1996 Film Regulations, supra note 148, art. 22.
396. See Censors and Sensibility, supra note 387.
397. See id.
398. See id.
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scene, Meiling was the only woman in a conference room,
negotiating with "all these male chauvinist warlords,"
according to Cheung.399 The censors seemed to have an
historical squabble- with that scene, because they felt it was
inaccurate to depict Meiling as having saved Chiang.4"' This
decision, according to Cheung, would have been made by the
Important Issues Committee.4 0 1 As an element of this historical
interpretation, Cheung hints that the censors took issue with
the rather feminist portrayal of a strong, independent
Meiling 2 'O'he authorities didn't like the portrait of Soong
Meiling growing from a young girl to a very mature and
independent woman- a powerful politician who helped Chiang,
her husband."
413
Aside from that particular scene, Cheung believes the
censors had a political/historical squabble with the film as a
whole.0 4 Traditionally, films about Chiang Kaishek treat him
as a two-dimensional class enemy because he was the leader
of the Nationalist Party 'which fought the commies for a long
time in the '30's."4 °, In contrast, Cheung approached Chiang's
character in a more balanced way, as three-dimensional
human with thoughts, feelings and a personal life.06 Thus,
much to Cheung's chagrin, she discovered that China is quite
particular about how its national enemies are depicted.
The censors cut another ten minutes at the end.0 7 In that
scene, the two younger Soong sisters escaped Japanese
attackers by jumping out of a plane.4 8 As they fall, sharing a
single parachute, their lives 'flash before their eyes.0 9 The
censors gave no reason for this cut. "I've been trying to think
what was wrong with this ending," commented Cheung, "Some
399. Id.
400. See Censors and Sensibility, supra note 387.
401. See id.
402. Id.
403. Tan, supra note 305.
404. See id.
405. Id.
406. See Censors and Sensibility, supra note 387.
407. See id.
408. See THE SISTERS THREE, supra note 394.
409. See id.
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said that it's not true, [that] it never happened, but many of
the things in my film never happened.' 10 Again, this suggests
historical squabbles, and that perhaps the censors were
willing to overlook a certain number of historical inaccuracies,
but not particularly exaggerated or romantic ones, as Cheung
admitted the ending might have been. "' If her suggestion that
"[mlaybe they thought it was too romantic," is accurate, it
indicates that the censors were concerned about
believability.' 2
The executive producer of The Sisters Three, Raymond
Chow, who is also chair of Golden Harvest, commented that
the cuts may have been made because the version submitted
differed from what the censors thought the film would be like
after only reading the script. 3 "Reading the script, every
reader forms his own visual version of the picture. But [later]
when a picture is well-made, it's a lot more dramatic and a lot
more powerful, so I can understand that the cut scenes were
quite different from what the censors anticipated originally.",
4
"
If this is the case, then the censors' motivation was apparently
no more sinister than their attempt to make the film conform
to their own ideas about the script.
Notwithstanding these speculations as to why particular
cuts were made, a couple of external factors likely played a
role in the censorship process. First, personnel at China's film
bureau had changed between the original script approval in
1993 and the film's completion and. submittal for censorship
in 1995 .4'1 The new censors had different instructions and
agendas: they were reportedly "hard-liners loathe to allow any
positive depiction of the Chiangs.'4'6 Second, the long turn-
around time during which the film and filmmakers were at the




413. SeeTan, supra note 305.
414. Id.
415. See Censors and Sensibility, supra note 387.
416. Betsy Sherman, An Epic Struggle for Chinese Epic, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
14, 1998, at C2.
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with the Hong Kong handover. Neither the director, Mabel
Cheung, nor Golden Harvest Chairman and the movie's
executive producer, Raymond Chow, admit to having timed it
that way.417 According to Chow, the timing "had nothing to do
with the handover. '418 Cheung's denial is somewhat more
disturbing. According to her, the film release's coincidence
with Hong Kong's handover was merely "an act of God."" 9
Although this comment was probably made for the public
record, so as not to incur the wrath of China by admitting
purposeful timing, the tone suggests resentful satire of
China's film authorities. 20
The Chinese censors have not demonstrated an affinity for
historical accuracy in movies. Domestic award-winning
director Song Jiangbo's film Lighthouse Keepers ambitiously
spans five decades of China's post-liberation history, but in
doing so glossed over some very difficult times. 2' This flaw in
the film, according to one critic, "threatens the authenticity of
the story. For example, the film does not give enough space to
showing how the lighthouse keepers stick to their principles in
a society [that] is becoming more and more commercialized."4 22
The very reason the reviewer criticized Lighthouse Keepers is
probably the reason the censors approved the film. The
authorities only allow positive treatments of China's modern,
communist history, because they view any critical social
commentary as a condemnation of the central government.
Thus the harmoniousness of Lighthouse Keepers not only
facilitated approval by the censors, but also got the film into
an official English-language newspaper review. Because the
leadership promotes the most positive elements of China's
417. SeeTan, supranote 305.
418. Id
419. Id.
420. U.S. distributors have manipulated release dates of Chinese films, as
well. For example, Miramax held up the U.S. release of Zhang Yimou's Temptress
Moon until 1997 in an effort to capitalize on the Hong Kong transition. See
Dretzka, supra note 367.
421. LIGHTHOUSE KEEPERS (Changchun Film Studio 1998).
422. Zhu Linyong, Deep Drama in Lighthouse, CHINA DAILY. Mar. 12, 1998 (last
visited Apr. 8, 1998) <http://www.chinadaily.net/cndy/history/d9-
198.b26.html>.
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culture to foreigners, films and other arts that show up in the
China Daily tend to be the most benign and free of political
viewpoints.
While China seeks to downplay official political content of
its films to foreigners, it actively encourages political content
to its film industry.423 By way of example, the official in charge
of the nation's political content in general, Minister of
Propaganda Ding Guang'en, attended the 1996 Changsha film
conference . 44 His presence at a film conference demonstrates
the acknowledged influence of the Propaganda Department in
Chinese filmmaking, and thereby explains the censors'
justification and mandate to require certain types of content.
At the meeting, Ding declared "Chinese movies should be
rooted in the country's history and reality."425 His statement
may well constitute the informal guidelines for acceptable
Chinese films. For the last decade or so, authorities have
censored most films and filmmakers who color outside the
lines of safely-past history, mundane day-in-the-life
depictions, and congratulatory celebrations of social
progress. 6 The past is a favored setting for films, according to
Zhang Yimou, because "it is easier to get them through the
censorship process if they have an historical theme."42 7 The
emphasis on history and reality leaves room for neither
aspirational nor progressive politics. Any progress to be
addressed should be that of past accomplishments, rather
than present recommendations.4 2 1 So filmmakers discovered
423. China Plans 50 Blockbuster Movies, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, Mar. 27,
1996, available in 1996 WL 9726169. 200 film artists attended this meeting,
along with State Councillor Li Tieying. See id.
424. See id.
425. Id.
426. See Harding, supra note 181.
427. Id. The authorities' affinity for period-films has created certain problems
such as costuming crises, because ancient costumes often must be hand-sewn,
which is very expensive and time consuming. Relief for this and other problems
has come in the form of regional leasing companies that serve as support
facilities for film companies. These firms develop film, lease movie sets, and
provide special effects experts, costume and set designers, as well as information
and promotional services. See Zeng Xixing, Calls for the Construction of a Film
Production Base in China, BEIJING REV., July 29-Aug. 4, 1996, at 31.
428. Telephone interview with Luo JianFan, formerly a playwright with the
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that the safest time period in which to set their films was the
pre-communist era.4 9  IS]hooting films set in the pre-
communist era... provided political safety."43 ° Hence the
1980s and early 90s proliferation of Chinese films reaching
back to the 1940s or earlier.
"If you drew your vision of China from the Chinese films
that make it onto foreign screens, you might think that the
country never progressed into the modem era."431 Marketing
plays a role in this preference, as well, because investors want
the films to sell well abroad.4 32 Foreign audiences feel a film is
more "Chinese" when it is filled with exotic representations of
"old" China.4 3 Accordingly, sets resembling the Forbidden City
and actresses dressed in silk qigong gowns make for high box
office earnings abroad.434
By setting their stories in decades and centuries past,
however, filmmakers cannot necessarily please the censors.
For example, Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou have each been
criticized by the Chinese authorities for pandering to
Westerners' appetite for China's feudal-era decadence.435 Thus
filmmakers are not allowed to be critical of either past or
China Youth Art Theatre in Beijing (May 9, 1998). This precedent may actually
have been set back in the days of the Cultural Revolution. A play called Hai Rui
Dismissed from Office [Hai Rui Ba Guan] has been credited with compelling Mao
to embark on the anti-rightist campaign, and the subsequent Cultural
Revolution. Set in the late Qing Dynasty, the play is about a member of the
emperor's court who resigned to protest the emperor's corrupt ways. The
emperor asked him to continue serving because Hal Rui was such a good, loyal
representative of the emperor's court to the people. Meanwhile, Mao was about to
unfold his anti-rightist movement in order to dismiss. his Minister of Defense,
Peng De Huai. Peng had sharply criticized Mao's communes after seeing people
suffering in the countryside.
429. SeeZha, supranote 9, at 147.
430. Id.
431. Richard James Havis, Casting Light on Today: A Chinese filmmaker dares
to move on, ASIAWEEK, Aug. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11653176.
Commenting on the Fifth Generation directors' affinity for films set in past eras,





435. See Anthony Kuhn, Movies: Epochal Ruler, Epic Treatment, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1998, at 26.
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present regimes. The censors want films to draw parallels
neither between past and current excesses nor past and
current repressions.
Tian Zhuangzhuang's 1994 film Blue Kite must have been
deemed too close to the present, especially because it is set
during the Cultural Revolution. A "personal and subtle
portrait of growing up during the Cultural Revolution," Blue
Kite was immediately banned by Chinese censors,437 and
probably helped inspire the blackout on Cultural Revolution
themes. 38 In the summer of 1996, the government issued a
series of twenty prohibitions. While most of these
436. Chen Kaige has observed, "There's a dilemma now in China: We don't
want to go back to the decadence and corruption of that time, but we also don't
want to return to the repressive period of Mao Tse-tung." Dretzka, supra note
367.
437. Zha, supra note 9, at 147.
438. An earlier admonition against discussion of the Cultural Revolution
occurred in 1981, when the Party's Central Propaganda Department issued
document No. 7, advising writers not to write too much about the Cultural
Revolution. Then in 1985, Deng Liqun, the authoritative leftist ideologue and
secretary of the Central Party Secretariat at the time, banned a book called
History of the Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution, co-written by Yan Jiaqi and
Gao Gao. The following year, a proposal for the establishment of a "Cultural
Revolution Museum" was flatly rejected by the Party Central. The suggestion was
set forth by Ba Jin, author of the well-known novel Jia and who was otherwise
respected by the authorities. Various dictionaries and encyclopedias of the
Cultural Revolution were compiled after 1987, but none was allowed to be
published. See Jin Dabal, What Are They Afraid Of?, CHINA Focus, June 1, 1996,
availabile in 1996 WL 11751441.
439. These prohibitions were translated by Chu May, and are listed in Zhong
Yanbo, The Increase in Ideological Control, CHINA Focus, July 1, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 11751485. Several of the prohibitions sought to gag the press on
topics of China's economy, leadership, ideology, racial conflicts, or election year
reporting:
1. Discussion and follow-up reports on hot topics among the people
concerning the economy and society are not permitted:
2. Discussion and debates on the systematic reform of the domestic
economy, especially on the reform of the state-owned sector, are
forbidden;
5. The study of traditional Chinese culture and philosophy must be
closely watched. Any intention of substituting Marxism, Leninism, and
Mao Zedong Thought with Confusianism must be severely prohibited:
6. All newspapers and broadcasting stations located in Beijing and most
provincial centers are forbidden to relay reports of racial confrontations
in the border areas in order to avoid negative Impacts on readers;
7. The international hot topics about this "election year" should not be
1999]
prohibitions targeted the press, a couple of them referred
specifically to film. 40 Prohibition Number Three stated: "All
articles and books about the Cultural Revolution are not to be
published; films about the Cultural Revolution are also
forbidden."
441
Particularly with the publication of these prohibitions,
some said the government's current degree of control over
expression, production and publication in 1996 was nearing
the level of the Cultural Revolution. 42
This prohibition helps explain the otherwise mysterious
banning of Zhang Yimou's 1994 film, To Live, depicting the life
of an ordinary couple during the Cultural Revolution. What
the leading clique of the Central Communist Party is afraid of,
apparently, is waking up the forces of protests that had been
silenced during the Cultural Revolution, and that pose a
threat to the present regime. 'The specters of those opposed to
the regime during the Cultural Revolution are still haunting
China. This makes the rulers immensely nervous.
443
The other relevant prohibition forbade themes of
individualism. 4 Prohibition Number Four states:
Any portrayal of individualism is not permitted in literary
works, including TV films, short stories, and novels.
Reversals of conclusions and verdicts on political events and
personages in history already made by the party are strictly
forbidden;
followed. When reporting on this topic, emphasis should be placed on
the scandals that have occurred during the electoral process so that the
readers can fully understand the hypocritical side of Western democracy;
8. All Party papers are not allowed to publish contributions from free-
lance writers without first being reviewed by the censors or without





443. Dabal, supra note 438. As another example, Director Li Shaohong
avoided the Cultural Revolution in his film Rouge (Hongfen) by going back one
decade earlier to the 1950s and focusing not on reform-through labor, but on
reforming of prostitutes. See id.
444. For a more complete list of the prohibitions, see Yanbo, supra note 439.
445. See id.
Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. [Vol. 21:239
CENSORSHIP IN CHINESE CINEMA
By declaring such a prohibition, the government thereby
elevated a cultural norm, a form of Ii, if you will, to the status
of a legal directive." 6 The prohibition also confirmed that any
constitutional rights of expression are trumped by the chief
goal of the constitution, which is to strengthen the state and
promote collective welfare, rather than to protect individual
interests against state power. 47
The prohibition against individualism may have been a
further basis for preventing Zhang from accompanying Keep
Cool to the Cannes Film Festival. Zhang himself has
speculated, "I think it's because they didn't like the film:
there's too much that's about an individual and his
philosophy. It's me expressing myself, and maybe there's too
much of me in it, it's too strong."44"8 Indeed, Keep Cool's hip
slang and surging hand-held camera effects broke with
Zhang's pattern of historical, aesthetically pleasing films."9
The director's speculation hearkens back to socialist strictures
against films that focus on the individual, and particularly
recalls the trouble Bai Hua encountered in the early 1980s. If
a film is to explore an individual, that character had better be
an exemplary communist figure, rather than a street-wise
hipster.
Condemnation of individualism in films reflects Maoist
teachings. "Since many writers and artists stand aloof from
the masses and lead empty lives, naturally they are unfamiliar
with the language of the people. Accordingly, their works are
not only insipid in language but often contain nondescript
446. Outside the flimmaking context there are penalties for demonstrating
excessive individualism, including disciplinary action such as public criticism,
written self-critisism, and in extreme cases, transfer to another work unit and
even another city. See JUDITH SHAPIRO & LIANG HENG, COLD WINDS, WARM WINDS
58 (1986).
447. See EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 168, at 27.
448. Joan Dupont, Zhang Yimou, Keeping Cool in the Face of Censorship, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 20, 1997, at 10. Moreover, Zhang suggested that the
government's problem with Keep Cool stemmed from a sort of personal vendetta
against him. "I really believe they feel, like when you see someone, and that
person makes you ill at ease... They can't think of any specific reason, but they
feel uneasy ..... This observation, however, begs the question of why Zhang and
his films made the authorities uneasy in the first place. Id
449. See id.
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expressions of their own coining which run counter to popular
usage."45° Though Mao was, of course, speaking generally
rather than describing experimental film, his comments would
apply even more forcefully to certain highly intellectualized
filmmakers of today.
Mao advocated a "mass style," which meant that the
"thoughts and feelings of... writers and artists should be
fused with those of the masses of. workers, peasants and
soldiers."45 ' An artist, to Mao,. should not be "a hero with no
place to display his prowess," meaning that artists' collection
of great truths is not appreciated by the masses.4 2 'The more
you put on the airs of a veteran before the masses and play
the 'hero,' the more you try to peddle such stuff to the masses,
the less likely they are to accept it." 453 Interestingly, China's
1990s leadership seems to have adopted this philosophy, and
positioned itself as "the masses." Today's octogenarian leaders
are the artistic ignorants unwilling to accept filmmakers'
nonconformist perspectives. Declaring many films
"incomprehensible" and "incomprehensible to the masses," the
leaders may as well declare that the films are above their
heads.
One might expect the'authorities to be more amenable to
critical portrayals of the West, because nationalism and unity
is less at stake and may even be bolstered by painting Western
lifestyles and people as less deserving of emulation, but indeed
when it comes to foreign fims, they favor films that paint
idealized or romantic pictures of the West. This preference
probably stems not from an official respect and etiquette
toward foreign cultures, but rather from the pragmatic
recognition that Chinese audiences would rather pay to see
feel-good films than more critical, unsentimental fare.
Regardless of the underlying reasons for such a preference,
one guidepost for any film's approval in China is that it paints
a positive, even rosy picture of its subject.
450. Mao Zedong, supra note 2, at 72.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 73.
453. Id.
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b. Style
Humor can act as an effective lubricant in helping films
ease through the approval process. Satirist Huang Jianxin has
lampooned many aspects of contemporary Chinese society,
such as bureaucracy in his 1986 black comedy The Black
Cannon Incident,4 4 and China's newfound obsession with
money in his 1993 comedy Stand up, Don't Bend Over [Zhan
zhi le, bie pa xia]4" and his 1996 Signal Left, Turn Right [Xiang
zu zhuan, wang you guai].456 These film titles alone would
seemingly attract consternation from the authorities, as one
alludes to guarding against, shall we say, hoodwinking, while
the other bluntly highlights the hypocrisy of China's
leadership. Despite such frank parody of Chinese society and
government, however, Huang's comedies have fared well with
the censors. Greasing social and political commentary in
humor seems to help films slip through the approval process.
Whether this means the censors understand the satire but
assume audiences will not, or whether the censors do not
understand the brunt of the jokes, is unclear. In any event,
"Ulust keep them laughing" seems the best strategy for
keeping censors' scissors still.
457
Another example of humor as grease for the censorship
gears is Zhou Xiaowen's 1994 film Ermo, about a woman who
sets her sights on owning the largest television in her village.45 8
Even though the film is set in contemporary China and
explores the dark side of capitalism, the censors apparently
found it non-threatening because it was a comedy rather than
454. THE BLACK CANNON INCIDENT (Xian Film Studio 1986).
455. STAND UP, DON'T BEND OVER (1993). According to film journalist Richard
James Havis: "Huang has a wicked eye for detail and leads his characters
through a wicked song and dance as they try to manipulate the system in their
favor. Indeed, to watch his films in order would be a lesson in the development of
Chinese society over the last 10 years." Havis, supra note 87.
456. SIGNAL LEFT, TURN RIGHT (1996). Set in a Shenzhen police driving school,
Signal Left, Tun Right is a comedy about a motley bunch of students, including a
heroin addict, a streetwise journalist, and a cell-phone packing entrepreneur, as
interested in making a fast buck and currying favor with officials as in passing
their tests. See Alison Dakota Gee, In Praise of Local Heroes: Asia's 10 best films
touched the right spots, ASIAWEEK, Dec. 27, 1996, at 73.
457. Havis, supra note 431.
458. ERMO (Ocean Film Corp. 1994).
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a drama. It is also possible, of course, that the censors who
viewed Ermo happened to be old-line communists suspicious
of current capitalist policies. Whatever the underlying reasons,
the authorities did not conclude that Ermo's social
commentary sufficiently undermined the current regime to
merit banning it.
Huang's subsequent experiences underscore this point.
While making Surveillance,459 which is a drama rather than a
comedy, Huang reportedly had a lot of trouble with the
censors. 460 As a result, the film makes fewer jabs at modem
society than did his previous films. Instead, Surveillance
focuses on the ailing love life of a security guard forced to
spend his nights on a stake-out.46 ' Notwithstanding the




Whereas in the past, foreign companies often used labs in
Japan to process their film, under the 1996 Film
Administration Regulations (Article 22), all film processing of
movies shot in China, whether the film was shot by state
studios or co-productions, must take place within China.463
Moreover, films must be substantially edited within China.46 4
Post-shooting production is a crucial point for censors to
interfere with a film; as a result many filmmakers try to
structure their project to avoid film processing and editing in
China. Chen Kaige managed to do so on his latest project, The




460. See Havis, supra note 87.
461. See id.
462. Id.
463. See 1996 Film Regulations, supra note 148, art. 22.
464. See id.
465. THE ASSASSIN.
466. See infra notes 327-521 and accompanying text.
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3. Approval upon completion
Even after a film reaches completion in the director's eyes,
it remains vulnerable to the censors. Films must be approved
by the censors upon completion,467 and will not be released
until the censors have finished, because the censors hold the
negatives of the film until they have approved it.4"8 Often films
whose scripts were approved before production nevertheless
fail to win approval after completion. A financially-based
explanation for this pattern has been offered by Tian
Zhuangzhuang, maker of The Blue Kite and The Horse Thief.
'They don't care as long as you have production money - in
this case, Hong Kong money. Nobody from the government's in
charge of what you're doing while making the film. They only
interfere after you're finished. 469
Sometimes the interference even occurs well after the film
is submitted for approval upon completion. Zhang Yimou's
Shanghai Triad, about the 1930s Shanghai crime world, was
slated to open the 1995 New York Film Festival but again
Chinese authorities prohibited Zhang from attending.470 Set in
a city of lots of money and lots of people trying to grab it,
Shanghai Triad tells of a powerful old man "who seems ripe for
gangster retirement, but who plans to lord it over everybody
for at least another twenty years."471 It would not have been
difficult for the government to perceive the parallels Zhang
drew between China's wicked pre-communist capitalism and
the wickedness of capitalism in China today, particularly
because during production the film crew working on Shanghai
Triad wore sweatshirts emblazoned with the following words:
"What appears bad is not necessarily bad. What appears good
is not necessarily good. The whole story takes place in what
467. See 1996 Film Administration Regulations, supra note 148, art 23.
468. See Kate Watson-Smyth, Irons says the US censors of 'Lolita' are as bad
as Chinese, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Sept. 5, 1997, at 2.
469. Lopate, supra note 138. Maintaining his sense of humor about the
difficulty of getting his completed films approved, Tian has commented, "I'm
always lucky when I'm making a film. My only problem is, I waste all my luck
during production. When it's time to face the censor, then I have bad luck." Id. at
62-63.
470. See Klawans, supra note 17, at 11.
471. Id. at 18.
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seems like the old Shanghai, but it is not just a story of old
Shanghai .... 42
Thus anyone on the set, including the usual censors,
would have seen this less-than-subtle explication of the film's
social comment; if the censors missed the point while reading
the script, Zhang and his crew seemed all too willing to spell it
out for them. Given such an explanation, the authorities may
have rightly assumed that audiences would catch on that the
decadence of the 1930 looked remarkably like the decadence
of today. In turn, the authorities feared, viewers might be
compelled to ask: "Why did we have the revolution?,
473
Because this is one question the Chinese government does not
want posed, this may be one reason the authorities seemingly
turned against Zhang between script approval and the New
York Film Festival.
The fact that the censors did not shut down Zhang's
production when they spotted the sweatshirts illustrates how
the authorities prefer to employ subsequent punishment to
prominent filmmakers, rather than prior restraint.474
Subsequent punishment- in this case, banning the director
from a film festival- makes a much louder statement both to
other directors and to the public, and it also serves as a
marketing gimmick. Foreign audiences apparently believe
banned films are inherently more controversial and thus more
interesting.
Not only are Chinese studio-produced films subject to this
post-completion step, but so are films co-produced by foreign
companies.4 7 At this stage companies hope for permission to
distribute the film, especially outside China.4 76
4. Taking the film out of China
After the film has been approved by the censors,
filmmakers still must receive permission before they can send
the film out of China, and even then only the exact footage
472. Tempest, supra note 208, at F6.
473. Id.
474. See discussion infra Part III.A.
475. See Havis, supra note 87.
476. See id.
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approved by the censors can be sent out.4 77 For a number of
reasons, many filmmakers hope for this permission, even if it
is not accompanied by permission to distribute their films
within China. The apparent strategy of many directors is to get
their films to foreign audiences first, in the hopes that success
abroad will inspire the Chinese authorities to allow domestic
distribution.
Zhang Yimou has successfully pursued this strategy with
a number of his films, a strategy that has led to fierce debates
about the meaning of Zhang's continued success abroad. Both
in the mainland and outside, and within both Chinese and
non-Chinese intellectual circles, many have wondered "if
Zhang owed his popularity to the shrewd marketing of oriental
exotica to the West."4 78 The fact that Zhang's films seemed
outlandish and looked so different from ordinary Chinese life,
yet captured so many foreign prizes and praises, caused some
to suspect that his films were made precisely with that aim in
mind.47 9 Critics pointed to many "grating inauthenticities" in
films such as Raise the Red Lantern, and concluded "this kind
of film is really shot for the casual pleasures of foreigners. "48
Raise the Red Lantern came closer than Zhang's earliest
films to discernible criticism of the current regime. With its
obsessive, claustrophobic symmetries of doorways framing
doorways, courtyards leading into other courts, and repetitive
patterned tiles, the film exudes control. Such a smothering,
fanatical tone is somehow appropriate for a post-Tiananmen
massacre film. Indeed, perhaps it was this sense of discipline
that made the censors give the film the go-ahead at the
screenplay stage-the film matched the renewed dominance
the central authorities felt over China's society, and expressed
a societal order the leaders felt China needed to prevent
distraction from reformist ideals. However, the tone of control
was not the image China wanted to export at that point.
477. See id.
478. Zha, supra note 9, at 146.
479. See id.
480. Id.
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Nevertheless, Zhang's films have been popular both at
home and abroad.48 ' Generally his films are released abroad
first, only later to be released in China. Official bans on Ju
Dott 8 2 and Raise the Red Lantern only added to their
attraction.483 When shown on Chinese screens, domestic
audiences have shown great enthusiasm, elevating actors like
Jiang Wen of Red Sorghum and Gong Li of nearly all Zhang's
films to superstar status.4 4 "With so many young filmmakers
striving to emulate his success and the media's tireless
coverage of him and his star Gong Li, Zhang emerged as one of
the country's susperstars on the pop culture scene. " "'
Some filmmakers do not want their films distributed in
China at all. After Tiananmen, for example, many Chinese
intellectuals have felt ambivalent toward China's pop
culture.4 6 In contrast to a somewhat more aspirational, overfly
political, tone of China's 1980's pre-Tiananmen culture, the
1990's have been a more commercial, "mass-audience-
oriented, politically ambiguous popular culture."487 Thus, as
members of the intellectual elite that held sway in the 1980s,
some filmmakers feel reluctant to participate in the mass-
marketing now necessary to shape general awareness. In other
words, they may feel "above all that," and prefer to reserve
their creations for more sophisticated circles, including the
more cinema-savvy West.
V
Reactions and Responses to Censorship
China's censorship of domestic and foreign films has
triggered international criticism and a variety of responses
from Chinese filmmakers. China's official response to
international criticism of its censorship policies has been
481. See Zha, supra note 9, at 146.
482. Ju Dou (1990).
483. See Zha, supra note 9. at 146.
484. See id
485. Id. For more on Zhang Yimou and Gong Li, see CHINA TODAY, Jan. 1993,
at 55-61.
486. See i at 121-22.
487. Id. at 121.
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brusque, but the actions of the members of China's film
industry indicate that success, persistence, a sense of humor,
and a pragmatic willingness to compromise are the best
weapons against the censors.
A. International Reactions
China has received strong reactions against its censorship
from abroad. In late 1996, forty-one actors, producers, and
directors wrote a letter to China's U.S. Ambassador Li Daoyu,
expressing alarm at Beijing's ongoing policy of artistic
censorship. 88 Spurred on by China's effort to thwart Disney's
release of Kundur89 by threatening to bar Disney's entry into
the Chinese market, the letter referred specifically both to
attempted interference in production and/or distribution of
non-Chinese films, and to restrictions placed upon Chinese
filmmakers, the latter of which twelve were listed.49 ° Indicating
that China's warning to Disney was only the latest incident in
a persistent effort by the Chinese government to censor the
film industry, the letter accused Beijing of attempting "to
impose worldwide censorship" on films in or about China.
49
'
The letter declared "wholly unacceptable" the Chinese
government's restrictions on the right of producers, directors,
distributors, writers, and others to freely express
themselves. 92 Urging foreign film companies to "actively and
488. The list of celeberties included prominent members of China's film
community as well as Hollywood names such as Bernardo Bertolucci, Barbra
Streisand, Susan Sarandon, Tim Robbins, Richard Dreyfuss, Richard Gere, and
Paul Newman. See Atkinson supra note 69, at 40.
489. KUNDUN (Disney 1997). The reason China cited for protesting the release
of Kundun is that they contend the movie glorifies the Dalai Lama, who rose up
against communist rule of Tibet in 1959. After the uprising failed, the Dalai
Lama fled his Himalayan homeland. His non-violent campaign for autonomy of
Tibet won him the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. Chinese officials also cited the default
complaint that the movie interferes in China's internal affairs. See, e.g., China
denies pressuring Disney over Dalai film, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, Dec.
12, 1996 available in LEXIS, News & Analysis File; Atkinson, supra note 69, at
39; Susan Bickelhaupt & Mauren Dezell, Hollywood heavyweights bear down on
Bejing, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 1996, at D2 (A Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson denied that the Ministry had ever threatened Disney).
490. See China denies pressuring Disney over Dalai film, supra note 489.
491. Id.
492. Atkinson, supra note 69, at 40.
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publicly oppose" all Chinese government efforts to censor
films, the letter even demanded that Beijing stop designating
which Chinese studios could sign agreements to sign foreign
films."'
In response to this letter, China's Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Cui TianKai suggested that while Hollywood can
make movies of whatever content it wishes, if the content is
perceived by Beijing to be "anti-China," the U.S. studios had
better be ready to face the consequences of those decisions,
such as negative repercussions on a studio's efforts to do
business in China.494
B. The Response of Chinese Filmmakers and Actors
Filmmakers generally know better than to protest
censorship by attempting to confront the authorities with legal
arguments. Instead, they pursue production and distribution
of their films through more subversive channels, such as
diplomacy in the international context, or wait it out or settle
for more private venues on the domestic front.
Very few members of China's film community are secure
enough in their status to be able to oppose China's censorship
without endangering their ability to make films, not to
mention their ability to carry on without other trouble from
the government. A few, however, are sufficiently well-known
internationally that they would probably be well-protected by
foreigners should they incur the wrath of the Chinese
government. One such person is actress Gong Li, who took
advantage of the international fame that shields her by calling
for less control on the arts.495 Invoking Mao's well-known
dictum of letting "a hundred flowers blossom,"496 she has
called upon the government make it a real policy by easing
censorship and taking a more tolerant approach to opening
the film industry to producers. The conservatism of the
Chinese authorities, she told Hong Kong reporters in Beijing,
493. Id.
494. See id.
495. See supra note 220.
496. See supra note 363 for the full quotation from which the phrase
"hundred flowers blossom" derives.
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depressed the state of the film industry by limiting the variety
of subjects permitted in films.49
Zhang Yimou is another internationally-prominent
member of China's film community who can get away with
some criticism- even mockery- of the censorship system.
The sweatshirt slogans worn by Shanghai Tiad's film crew
were a thinly-veiled nose-thumbing at the censors, implying
that censors would not, understand the film and needed T-
shirt slogans as a big hint.498 This is probably one of the bolder
moves by a filmmaker subject to censorship, and a director of
lesser status likely would not have gotten away with such
attitude.
Zhang and Gong's actions may indicate a realization that
the Chinese authorities, with their often arbitrary bans and
censorship, may be engaging in the scapegoating technique
colorfully articulated in the Chinese proverb, "Killing the
chicken to scare the monkeys." While the authorities seek to
enforce a certain level of accountability for high-profile
filmmakers whose works and celebrity are known, those very
filmmakers are sufficiently well-connected that enforcement
measures against them amount to scare tactics aimed at the
more subversive directors whose ideas actually could
undermine the regime.
Despite the T-shirt incident, it would be inaccurate to
categorize Zhang as . rebellious; indeed, Zhang's career
exemplifies the negotiative approach China takes to
filmmaking. From the earliest days of his film career, ,he had
to persuade the authorities to allow him to proceed, step by
step. For example, although Zhang passed the entrance test
for the Beijing Film Academy when it had just reopened in
1977, he was denied admission because he was 27 and the
maximum age for matriculation was 22 . Zhang appealed to
Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic, reformist policies by explaining to
the Ministry of Culture that the Cultural Revolution had
stolen ten years of his life. His appeal succeeded, and Zhang
497. See supra note 220.
498. These sweatshirt slogans are quoted in Part IV.B.3, infra. See also, supra
notes 472-476 and accompanying text.
499. See Klawans, supra note 17, at 12.
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enrolled in the Academy's class of '82.'00 Thus embarked
Zhang on his navigation of politics surrounding the politics
and legalities of filmmaking in China.
The price exacted by China's film authorities for Zhang's
critical international success with Red Sorghum was for Zhang
to make his next film a more populist crowd-pleaser. The
result was his rarely screened Code Name Cougar,50' a thriller
about an highjacked airliner. Strikingly different in style and
content from Zhang's earlier and later films, this one looked
"like a made-for-TV movie." 0 2 Despite its B-grade look and
approach, though, this film is significant for its surprisingly
overt politics. The highjacked airliner is not just any airline,
but a Taiwanese airline. After the airline is forced down on the
mainland, the People's Republic agrees to cooperate with
Taiwan on a rescue mission. The cooperation is secret,
however, and expresses an optimism and agenda that
underlying humanity and common goals would reunite Taiwan
with mainland China.
0 3
That Zhang would direct such a mainstream propaganda
vehicle for the government suggests it was part of a quid pro
quo- his end of a deal that would allow him to produce his
next artful project. In this way, Code Name Cougar's "pre-
Tiananmen theme of reconciliation now seems the most
interesting aspect of a production that was probably a
potboiler for Zhang, while he negotiated the financing and
review-board clearance for Ju Dou," Zhang's plaintive,
painterly film about oppressed love. 4
Another example of Zhang's pragmatism is his response to
the actions of the Chinese censors who banned his Keep Cool
from the Cannes Film Festival. Zhang's response was neither
to admit defeat and send his film home, nor to object that the
Chinese government had trampled his freedom of
expression.0 5 Instead, he immediately contacted the Venice
500. See id.




505. See Dupont, supra note 448, at 10.
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Film Festival to see if his film could be shown there. "I know
that the last thing you should do when dealing with Chinese
censorship is to respond with declarations on freedom of
expression. My motto has been, get them to let the film out
first, make statements later."
50 6
In addition to Zhang Yimou, other previously experimental
Fifth Generation directors have compromised their once
relentless avant-garde standards in favor of more entertaining
or acceptable subject matter. For example, Tian
Zhuangzhuang had been "one of the most intractable enfants
terribles of the Fifth Generation."5 .7 After making a number of
artsy, experimental films in the early and mid-1980s, Tian
made Rock 'n' Roll Kids (Yaogun qingnian) in 1988, reportedly
"to prove he was capable of shooting flashy commercial
entertainment."50 8 In 1990 Tian returned to safe territory by
directing an historical drama, Li Lianying, The Imperial Eunuch
(Da taijian Li Lianying),509 a film set safely back in imperial
China. 10
The careers of these directors indicate that, given the
options of either serving the government with their works or
risking chastisement by satisfying their own creativity, the
Fifth Generation carved out a third option by learning to
navigate back and forth between their own sensibilities and
those of the government. The most fruitful filmmakers are not
those who adhere to their artistic principles for the sake of an
idealized artistic nobility, but those who take a more
entrepreneurial approach of savvy give-and-take with the
government. The filmmakers who seem most agile at
navigating the sea of censorship are those who test the
bureaucratic winds, then tack in a direction that best fills
their sails.
Another response by some directors to China's strict film
censorship has been to learn to work the censorship system in
their favor, particularly the system's human element. For
506. Id.
507. Zha, supra note 9, at 147 (emphasis added).
508. Id.
509. Li LIANYING, THE IMPERIAL EUNUCH (1991).
510. See Zha, supra note 9, at 147.
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example, Mabel Cheung, who directed The Sisters Three, has
noted that the censors' instructions do not always get carried
out. When calling for cuts, the censors dictate the designated
segments to their secretaries. However, because these
secretaries are writing down the instructions, without the use
of tape recorders or dictaphones, they have significant control
over what gets written down. "So if you are friendly to the
secretary, he will conveniently forgetto write something, and
you don't have to make the change."'
Another savvy director facilitated approval of his film in a
particularly creative way. One of the first Sixth Generation
directors, movie star Jiang Wen made his directorial debut
with In the Heat of the Sun (Yangguang canlan de riz 512, a rite-
of-passage story about a Beijing boy and his teenage pals
growing up in the mid- 1970s. Based on a novel by Wang
Shuo513 and set during the Cultural Revolution, the film was a
prime candidate for censorship trouble due to both the ban on
Wang Shuo's works as well as the ban on films and literature
about the Cultural Revolution. One reason this film received
approval may be that it does not treat the Cultural Revolution
directly, but rather uses the political history as a backdrop for
the "intense personal drama of adolescent violence and
romance."514 A likely more important reason the censors
approved the film, however, was a clever move by the director.
During production, Jiang dealt with the on-set censor by
511. Sherman, supra note 416, at C2.
512. Aside from the censors, In the Heat of the Sun was roundly criticized by
local critics for treating the Cultural Revolution too lightly. "The period, they
argued, is too painful a memory to serve as the backdrop for a movie about
rowdy adolescents." Alison Dakota Gee and Anne Naham, China has a new breed
of writers: They believe in nothing and mock everything, ASIAWEEK, Aug. 9, 1996,
at 38, available in 1996 WL 11652854. Such negative reviews demonstrate the
continued ambivalence Chinese society as a whole feels toward the Cultural
Revolution. Despite the reviews, however, and thanks mostly to Jiang Wen's star
power, In the Heat of the Sun opened in China in 1995 to theaters packed with
young audiences and "caused such a buzz that some local reporters claimed it
was beating imported Hollywood blockbusters in box office returns." Zha, supra
note 9, at 148.
513. For more details on Wang Shuo's own experiences with the censors, see
Teresa Poole, China's 'Hooligan' Author Falls Foul of the Censor, THE
INDEPENDENT, Dec. 15, 1996, at 16.
514. Zha, supra note 9, at 148.
[Vol. 21:239
soliciting his participation in the film. Jiang gave the censor a
role, to "help him understand and stop acting like a
policeman."5 The director's strategy apparently worked,
because the film was completed and approved. The censors
did hold the film for thirteen months and did require a few
cuts. The authorities also stuck to their familiar pattern by
subsequently banning Jiang from participating in the 1996
Golden Horse Awards ceremony in Taiwan, where In the Heat
of the Sun won six awards.1 6
These considerable obstacles the government throws in
the way of Chinese filmmakers .have driven some to leave the
country. Chen Kaige, for example, tired of all this apparent
control over production and participation in international film
festivals, has moved to New York. He does, however, maintain
a working relationship with the Chinese film authorities. Due
to his good standing, both with the authorities and financially,
he has been able to carve out some exemptions for his projects
from the censorship rules.
Chen's most recent film, another lavish historical epic
titled The Assassin, addresses political succession and the
corruption born of absolute- power by describing Qin
Shihuang, '1 7 a Chinese emperor who reigned in the 3rd
Century B.C. Although Chen declined to submit a script for
this film to China's Film Bureau, he remains in sufficiently
good standing with the film authorities to have received
permission to use the state-run Beijing Film Studio's extensive
515. JIANG WEN: China's hippest director and actor, ASIAWEEK, Mar. 6, 1998,
at 33, available in 1998 WNL 7904991. Jiang Wen's "blend of attitude and
servitude," not to mention his fame and considerable fortune in China, has
helped him survive the political minefield of China's censorship system. "It's not
that Jiang Wen, 35, doesn't test official tolerance. It's just that when he does, it's
with a smile." Id.
516. See supra note 512.
517. In contrast to China's last monarch, "the impotent puppet who could
barely feed and clothe himself' described in Bernardo Bertolucci's film, 'The Last
Emperor," Qin Shihuang was "a classic tyrant whose power and brutality have
awed and disgusted Chinese for centuries." He completed his conquest of five
other kingdoms in 221 B.C. to become the first emperor to rule over a united
China. The dynasty lie founded was short-lived but crucial in China's history.
Qin Shihuang is credited with many surviving innovations, such as China's
earliest bureaucracy, legal codes, highway network rivaling that of the Roman
Empire. See Kuhn, supra note 435.
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outdoor sets.5"' He retains his independence through foreign
funding, and foreign investment in this biggest independently
financed film ever made in China has allowed Chen to conduct
his post-production work outside of China, away from Chinese
censors' scissors.519
Considering The Assassins politically loaded content,
520
and considering that Chen could not say whether The
Assassin would receive approval to be shown in China, he and
his investors took a major gamble with this film. 5 21 The Sixth
Generation filmmakers have responded to censorship "by
manipulating the loopholes of the official studio system and
obtaining the support of various foreign festivals" in order to
carve out a lively film subculture in China.522 They have also
documented the difficulties of filmmaking by creating films
about the subject itself.523 Similarly, Han Jianwei shot
interviews of numerous directors who told their bleak stories
about their censorship experiences.524
VI
Conclusion
Having analyzed how Chinese law treats films, a look at
how a particular film treats Chinese law seems appropriate in
conclusion. Zhang Yimou's 1992 film Qiu Ju goes to Court (Qiu
ju da guansO525 not only exemplifies certain principles and
approaches that facilitate film approval in China, but it also
provides an interesting metaphor for China's bureaucracy of
film oversight.
518. See Gellman, supra note 242, at C4.
519. See Kuhn, supra note 435.
520. Although some have perceived allusions to Mao Zedong in Chen's
depiction of the emperor, the director admitted no such intent. "A film about the
revolutionary leader would not be allowed," he said, despite his independence in
working on The Asssassin. Gellman, supra note 242.
521. See Kuhn, supra note 435.
522. Zha, supra note 9, at 148.
523. One example of this type of film is Ning Dai's Discussions Caused by a
Film Being Stopped
524. See NPR radio broadcast, supra note 174.
525. Qiu Ju GoEs To CouRT (Youth Film Studio of Beijing Film Academy
1992).
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In this film Zhang broke from his pattern of artful
cinematography to create a more documentary-like portrayal
of a woman's struggle. Like many of his films, Qiu Ju is set in
China's rural northeast, but this time in more or less
contemporary China. Navigating China's nearly impenetrable
legal system in order to avenge her husband's injury, the
character Qiu Ju struggles with bureaucracy and inertia.
Despite its critical, relatively straightforward portrayal of
China's lack of meaningful legal recourse, this film received a
warm reception from China's censors. Even Deng Xiaoping is
said to have viewed and approved it. 528 This is probably due
not to the censors' recognition that the film told truths about
China's civil justice system as much as the fact that Zhang
kept the mood light and humorous with a jocular
soundtrack,527  and perhaps also because the censors
accurately forecast that the film would not attract as wide an
audience as Zhang's prettier films.528 In any event, the film
reached audiences both in China and abroad.
In the end, the character Qiu Ju discovers that her search
for justice has changed her, and not necessarily for the
526. See Tempest, supra note 208. Such a warm reception by the authorities
stands in stark contrast to China's more recent outrage over the U.S. film Red
Comer, which angered Chinese authorities by portraying China's judicial system
as inadequate, corrupt and sinister. Although Red Corner's U.S. star Richard
Gere has received much publicity and wrath from China due not only to this film
but also due to his pro-Tibet activities, the fim's Chinese star BaJ Ling risked
more worrisome consequences. Mostly her consequences involved isolation,
because mainland directors have decided against casting her in movies to avoid
any problems from the authorities, and journalists killed stories about her for
the same reason. A visiting friend here in the U.S. who contacted the Chinese
embassy to locate her was warned not to contact her. Bai Ling did not even tell
her family about Red Comer because she did not want them to worry, and did
not want the authorities to give them trouble. See A Chinese star risks her
country's wrath with 'Red Comer,' NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1997, at 78.
527. Whether it was Zhang or the censors or both who decided they liked the
humor and music of Qui Ju so much that it should be emphasized even more in
Zhang's subsequent film To Live is hard to know, but the film's humor and
music probably were instrumental in getting the screenplay past the censors.
528. This was not for lack of a pretty star-in a break from her usual roles,
Zhang's favorite actress Gong Li played an unglamorous peasant, padded clothes
and all. The film won a Golden Lion at the 1992 Venice Film Festival. See David
Robinson, Sequels to the Glory Days, THE LONDON TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at arts
3.
CENSORSHIP IN CHINESE CINEMA19991
Hastings Comm/Ent L.J.
better.529 The system through which and against which she
struggled so hard left its mark on her. China's filmmakers,
too, are products of a censorship system that is generally
vexing and often impenetrable. In turn some of them react by
vexing the authorities, or by expressing their ideas in
increasingly impermeable or disguised ways. Or, they learn
the give-and-take with the government that is necessary to
carry out their projects.
529. See Klawans, supra note 17, at 11, 14.
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